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INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
 For this installment of the Recent Developments, we examine re-
cent decisions of both the United States Supreme Court and the Flor-
ida Supreme Court; one piece of controversial 2005 Florida legisla-
tion; and the Florida and federal judicial and legislative involvement 
in the Theresa Schiavo controversy. The opening Note examines the 
United States Supreme Court’s decision in Gonzales v. Raich (Raich 
II),1 where the Court held that the Commerce Clause permits Con-
gress to prohibit local cultivation and possession of marijuana for 
medical purposes in compliance with state law. 2  
                                                                                                                      
 1. 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005).  
 2. Amanda Quirke contributed this Note.  
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 Our coverage of three recent Florida Supreme Court decisions be-
gins with Tyne v. Time Warner Entertainment Co. (Tyne III),3 where 
the court held that “commercial purpose,” as used in Florida’s com-
mercial misappropriation statute, does not apply to a motion picture 
that does not directly promote a product or service.4 Patchen v. Flor-
ida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services (Patchen II),5 
examines the Florida Supreme Court’s most recent pronouncement 
in the citrus canker saga.6 Allstate Indemnity Co. v. Ruiz,7 examines 
the Florida Supreme Court’s holding that in an action for bad faith 
against an insurance company, work-product privilege does not pro-
tect materials prepared through the date of the resolution of the un-
derlying claim for coverage.8 
 The next Note examines the Florida Legislature’s controversial 
enactment of the Judiciary Committee’s Committee Substitute for 
Senate Bill 436 and the corresponding changes to Florida’s self-
defense law.9 The final Note chronicles the federal and Florida judi-
cial and legislative involvement in the Theresa Schiavo controversy.10 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—COMMERCE CLAUSE—UNITED STATES 
SUPREME COURT HOLDS COMMERCE CLAUSE PERMITS CONGRESS TO 
PROHIBIT LOCAL CULTIVATION AND POSSESSION OF MARIJUANA FOR 
MEDICAL PURPOSES IN COMPLIANCE WITH CALIFORNIA LAW—
Gonzales v. Raich (Raich II), 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005) 
 At least nine states, including California, have authorized the use 
of marijuana for medical purposes.11 California’s Compassionate Use 
Act of 1996 exempts from criminal prosecution “a patient, or . . . a 
patient’s primary caregiver, who possesses or cultivates marijuana 
for the personal medical purposes of the patient upon the written or 
oral recommendation or approval of a physician.” 12  
 Respondents Raich13 and Monson used marijuana upon the rec-
ommendation of their board-certified family practitioners for the 
                                                                                                                      
 3. 901 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 2005). 
 4. Maureen Walterbach contributed this Note.  
 5. 906 So. 2d 1005 (Fla. 2005).   
 6. Melinda Parks contributed this Note. 
 7. 899 So. 2d 1121 (Fla. 2005).  
 8. Amanda Quirke contributed this Note. 
 9. Jessica Slatten contributed this Note.  
 10. Richard Junnier contributed this Note.  
 11. The other states include Alaska, Colorado, Hawaii, Maine, Nevada, Oregon, Ver-
mont, Washington. Gonzales v. Raich (Raich II), 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2198 (2005). Additionally, 
in 1998 Arizona voters rejected repeal of a voter initiative that permits physicians to pre-
scribe Schedule I substances for medical purposes, and in 2004 Montana voters approved 
an initiative authorizing use of marijuana for medical purposes. Id.   
 12. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5(d) (West 2005). 
 13. Raich received locally grown marijuana for no charge from two caregivers, litigat-
ing as “John Does.” Raich II, 125 S. Ct. at 2200.  
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treatment of serious medical conditions.14 Monson, who cultivated 
her own marijuana, was the subject of a raid in August 2002.15 
County deputy sheriffs determined Monson’s possession and cultiva-
tion of marijuana were in compliance with California law; however, 
agents from the federal Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) seized and 
destroyed all six of her marijuana plants under the apparent author-
ity of the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA).16  
 Subsequently, Raich and Monson petitioned a California federal 
district court for injunctive relief, requesting that the court prohibit 
the enforcement of the CSA “to the extent it prevents them from pos-
sessing, obtaining, or manufacturing cannabis for their personal 
medical use.”17 However, the petition was denied.18 On appeal, the 
Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of injunctive relief.19 
The Ninth Circuit found respondents had “demonstrated a strong 
likelihood of success on their claim that, as applied to them, the CSA 
is an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’ [sic] Commerce Clause 
authority.”20 The court found “that intrastate, noncommercial culti-
vation and possession of cannabis for personal medical purposes as 
recommended by a patient’s physician pursuant to valid California 
state law” is a “separate and distinct class of activities,” which is be-
yond the reach of federal power.21 
 Congress enacted the CSA to “conquer drug abuse and to control 
the legitimate and illegitimate traffic in controlled substances.”22 The 
CSA makes it unlawful “to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or 
possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a con-
trolled substance” except in a manner authorized by the CSA.23 Con-
gress made express findings about the close relationship between lo-
cal distribution and possession and the interstate traffic of controlled 
substances.24  
 Controlled substances are divided into five schedules based on 
“their accepted medical uses, the potential for abuse, and their psy-
chological and physical effects on the body.”25 Marijuana is a Sched-
ule I drug, which is a category reserved for drugs with a high poten-
                                                                                                                      
 14. Raich’s physician provided a statement that Raich had tried “essentially” all other 
legal alternatives, and her cessation of marijuana use may prove fatal. Raich v. Ashcroft 
(Raich I), 352 F.3d 1222, 1225 (9th Cir. 2003), vacated, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005).  
 15. Raich II, 125 S. Ct. at 2200. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
  18. Id. 
 19. Raich I, 352 F.3d at 1235. 
 20. Id. at 1227. 
 21. Id. at 1228 (emphasis omitted).  
 22. Raich II, 125 S. Ct. at 2203. 
 23. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2000). 
 24. Id. § 801(1)-(6). 
 25. Raich II, 125 S. Ct. at 2203-04. 
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tial for abuse, lack of any accepted medical use, and lack of accepted 
safety for use under medical supervision.26 Schedule II substances 
are distinguished from Schedule I substances because the former 
have a currently accepted medical use.27 
 On appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, respondents asserted an 
“as applied” challenge to the CSA, arguing that “the CSA’s categori-
cal prohibition of the manufacture and possession of marijuana as 
applied to the intrastate manufacture and possession of marijuana 
for medical purposes pursuant to California law exceeds Congress’ 
[sic] authority under the Commerce Clause.”28 However, the Supreme 
Court expressly refuted this definition of respondents’ class of activi-
ties, which was also used by the Ninth Circuit.29  
 First, the majority discounted the distinction that marijuana has 
a medical purpose because the CSA includes many substances that 
are used for medicinal purposes.30 Since marijuana is a Schedule I 
drug, the CSA prohibits its use for any purpose, including medical 
purposes sanctioned by a licensed physician. Therefore, the fact that 
respondents use marijuana for medical purposes does not distinguish 
the activity from the activities regulated by the CSA.31 
 Second, the majority disputed the assertion that since respon-
dents’ activities are intrastate, it is beyond the scope of the Con-
gress’s authority under the Commerce Clause. “Congress has the 
power to regulate activities that substantially affect interstate com-
merce,”32 and more specifically, “the power to regulate purely local 
activities that are part of an economic ‘class of activities’ that have a 
substantial effect on interstate commerce.”33  
 The Court relied on its earlier decision in Wickard v. Filburn, 
where a farmer, for his personal use, cultivated wheat outside of his 
allotment under the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938.34 The 
farmer argued Congress did not have the power to regulate the pro-
duction and consumption of wheat, “since they are local in character, 
and their effects upon interstate commerce are at most ‘indirect.’ ”35 
The Court disagreed and found Congress can regulate purely intra-
                                                                                                                      
 26. 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1). 
 27. Id. § 812(b)(2). 
 28. Raich II, 125 S. Ct. at 2204-05.  
 29. Raich v. Ashcroft (Raich I), 352 F.2d 1222, 1227-29 (9th Cir. 2003) (defining the 
class of activities). 
 30. Raich II, 125 S. Ct. at 2211. 
 31. Id.  
 32. Id. at 2205 (citing NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937)). 
 33. Id.; see also Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).  
 34. 317 U.S. at 114-15.  
 35. Id. at 119.  
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state activity if the class of activity has a “substantial economic effect 
on interstate commerce.”36  
 Using the same reasoning, the Raich II Court held that “Congress 
had a rational basis for concluding that leaving home-consumed 
marijuana outside federal control would similarly affect price and 
market conditions.”37 The CSA was not only enacted to control drug 
abuse but also to control the supply and demand of controlled sub-
stances. The concern was previously articulated in Wickard that due 
to high demand, the home-grown product, be it wheat or marijuana, 
will be drawn into the interstate market.38 This would impede the 
federal interest in regulating, or in the case of marijuana, completely 
eliminating, commercial transactions of the product.39  
 Respondents pointed to the fact that Congress has made no spe-
cific findings about whether their class of activities would substan-
tially affect the interstate market for marijuana.40 However, specific 
findings are not necessary because the Court is only required to de-
termine whether Congress had a rational basis for the legislation.41 
According to the Court: 
Given the enforcement difficulties that attend distinguishing be-
tween marijuana cultivated locally and marijuana grown else-
where, 21 U.S.C. § 801(5), and concerns about diversion into illicit 
channels, we have no difficulty concluding that Congress had a ra-
tional basis for believing that failure to regulate the intrastate 
manufacture and possession of marijuana would leave a gaping 
hole in the CSA.42 
 The respondents and the Ninth Circuit relied heavily on United 
States v. Lopez43 and United States v. Morrison,44 but Stevens, writ-
                                                                                                                      
 36. Id. at 125. 
 37. Raich II, 125 S. Ct. at 2207. In contrast, the Ninth Circuit found that since the re-
spondents’ class of activities was not commercial, Wickard did not apply to this case. Raich 
v. Ashcroft (Raich I), 352 F.3d 1222, 1230 (9th Cir. 2003).  
 38. Raich II, 125 S. Ct. at 2207; see also Wickard, 317 U.S. at 128.  
 39. Raich II, 125 S. Ct. at 2207. 
 40. Id. at 2208. However, Congress made specific findings regarding the relationship 
between (1) drugs manufactured and distributed intrastate and (2) interstate drug traffic.  
21 U.S.C. § 801(1)-(6) (2000). Nevertheless, O’Connor’s dissent questioned these state-
ments as “bare declarations . . . asserted without any supporting evidence.”  Raich II, 125 
S. Ct. at 2227 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 41. Raich II, 125 S. Ct. at 2208 (majority opinion).  
 42. Id. at 2209 (footnote omitted).  
 43. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). In Lopez, the Supreme Court held the Gun-Free School Zones 
Act of 1990, which made it a federal offense “for any individual knowingly to possess a 
firearm at a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school 
zone,” was beyond the scope of Congress’s Commerce Clause authority. Id. at 549 (quoting 
18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (1988 ed., Supp. V)). 
 44. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). In Morrison, the Supreme Court held section 13981 of the 
Violence Against Women Act of 1994, which provided a civil remedy to a victim of a gen-
der-motivated crime, could not be upheld under the Commerce Clause. Id. at 616-20.   
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ing for the majority, made several distinctions between Raich II and 
the recent Commerce Clause precedent. First, the parties in Lopez 
and Morrison both challenged a statute in its entirety as unconstitu-
tional and beyond the scope of Congress’s Commerce Clause power.45 
“This distinction is pivotal for [the Court has] often reiterated that 
‘[w]here the class of activities is regulated and that class is within 
the reach of federal power, the courts have no power ‘to excise, as 
trivial, individual instances’ of the class.’ ”46 
 Another distinction made by the majority was “the CSA is a stat-
ute that directly regulates economic, commercial activity.”47 In con-
trast, the statutes at issue in Lopez and Morrison regulated criminal, 
noneconomic conduct and required a chain of inferences to make a 
connection between the subject of the regulation and interstate com-
merce.48 Thus, the statutes in Lopez and Morrison were beyond the 
reach of Congress’s Commerce Clause power because they did not 
regulate economic activity.49 Noneconomic activity can be regulated 
only as “an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, 
in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intra-
state activity were regulated.”50  
 Finally, the Court found that the last element of the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s distinction, the possession and use in accordance with state 
law, also fails under the Supremacy Clause.51 Under the Supremacy 
Clause, federal law prevails where there is a conflict between state 
and federal law.52 Even if marijuana had a legitimate medical pur-
pose, as asserted by respondents, the CSA imposes stricter require-
ments on all drugs by requiring registration with the DEA, reporting 
and prescription requirements, and other security measures.53 If 
marijuana were classified within a less restrictive schedule, the CSA 
would still impose more controls than the California law.54 Therefore, 
the federal law, the CSA, prevails under the Supremacy Clause.  
                                                                                                                      
 45. Raich II, 125 S. Ct. at 2209. 
 46. Id. at 2209 (quoting Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154 (1971)). 
 47. Id. at 2211. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Justice Scalia clarified in his concurring opinion that Lopez and Morrison do not 
state that Congress never has the power to regulate noneconomic intrastate activity. Id. at 
2218 (Scalia, J., concurring).  
 50. Id. at 2209 (majority opinion) (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 
(1995)).   
 51. Id. at 2212-13.  
 52. Id. 
 53. Id.  
 54. The Supreme Court specifically discussed the lack of regulation imposed on physi-
cians by the California law, where physicians have no limits on the dosage, duration, or 
purpose of the prescription, which could therefore lead to abuse by unscrupulous physi-
cians. Id. at 2213.  
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 Justice Scalia, in his concurring opinion, distinguished between 
Congress’s power to regulate activities that “substantially affect” in-
terstate commerce and Congress’s power under the Necessary and 
Proper Clause. Under the Necessary and Proper Clause, “[w]here 
necessary to make a regulation of interstate commerce effective, Con-
gress may regulate even those intrastate activities that do not them-
selves substantially affect interstate commerce.”55 Thus, “[t]he regu-
lation of an intrastate activity may be essential to a comprehensive 
regulation of interstate commerce even though the intrastate activity 
does not itself ‘substantially affect’ interstate commerce.”56  
 Justice O’Connor’s strong dissent asserted there is no material 
distinction between Raich II and precedent set by Lopez and Morri-
son.57 O’Connor rejected the distinction in the majority opinion that 
the statutes in Lopez and Morrison were single-subject statutes regu-
lating noncommercial, criminal activity, while the CSA is a larger 
regulatory scheme controlling economic activity.58 This “suggests that 
the federal regulation of local activity is immune to Commerce 
Clause challenge because Congress chose to act with an ambitious, 
all-encompassing statute.”59  
 O’Connor insisted the analysis must be restricted to the “personal 
cultivation, possession, and use of marijuana for medicinal pur-
poses.”60 She also disputed the majority’s interpretation of economic 
activity as overbroad61 and reasoned that the marijuana at issue in 
this case was never in the stream of commerce, nor does personal 
cultivation and possession of marijuana in general have any commer-
cial character.  
 O’Connor also found there was no evidence that medical mari-
juana users have a substantial impact on the drug market or are 
“enough to threaten the federal regime.”62 “[S]omething more than 
                                                                                                                      
 55. Id. at 2216 (Scalia, J., concurring).   
 56. Id. at 2217.  
 57. Id. at 2221 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 58. Id. at 2222-23. 
 59. Id. at 2222; see also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560 (1995) (distinguish-
ing the Gun-Free School Zones Act from commerce because it “is not an essential part of a 
larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut 
unless the intrastate activity were regulated. It cannot, therefore, be sustained under our 
cases upholding regulations of activities that arise out of or are connected with a commer-
cial transaction, which viewed in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate com-
merce”). 
 60. Raich II, 125 S. Ct. at 2224 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 61. Id. “[T]he Court’s definition of economic activity for purposes of Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence threatens to sweep all of productive human activity into federal regulatory 
reach.” Id.  
 62. Id. at 2228. The majority stated that it is unnecessary to “determine whether re-
spondents’ activities, taken in the aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce in 
fact.” Id. at 2208. However, Justice O’Connor used this basis to distinguish Wickard, be-
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mere assertion is required when Congress purports to have power 
over local activity whose connection to an intrastate market is not 
self-evident. Otherwise, the Necessary and Proper Clause will always 
be a back door for unconstitutional federal regulation.”63 Thus, 
O’Connor concluded that “whatever the wisdom of California’s ex-
periment with medical marijuana, the federalism principles that 
have driven our Commerce Clause cases require that room for ex-
periment be protected in this case.”64 
 Justice Thomas also dissented on similar grounds, arguing that 
the respondents’ activities were neither interstate nor commercial 
and therefore were not within Congress’s power to regulate under 
the Commerce Clause or the Necessary and Proper Clause.65 He 
stressed this was an “as applied” challenge, and therefore the ques-
tion was “[W]hether the intrastate ban is ‘necessary and proper’ as 
applied to medical marijuana users like respondents.”66  
 Like O’Connor, Thomas also insisted the analysis must be made 
in the specific context of medical marijuana users, whose conduct is 
distinguished in the California statute, which sets controls and 
guidelines for that specific class of people.67 On that basis, he dis-
puted the majority’s application of the “substantial effects” test be-
cause the conduct being evaluated by the majority is the “intrastate 
manufacture and possession of marijuana,” instead of limiting the 
class to medical marijuana users.68  
 Thomas, like O’Connor, argued that the government had offered 
no “obvious reason why banning medical marijuana use [was] neces-
sary to stem the tide of interstate drug trafficking.”69 Thomas found 
that the respondents’ class of activities was beyond the reach of Con-
gress’s power under the Commerce Clause because it was purely in-
trastate.70 Further, the Necessary and Proper Clause did not provide 
Congress with authority because the regulation of Respondents’ ac-
tivities was purely incidental.71 Therefore, Thomas concluded “Con-
gress has encroached on States’ traditional police powers to define 
the criminal law and to protect the health, safety, and welfare of 
their citizens.”72 
                                                                                                                      
cause the court evaluated actual evidence of the effect homegrown wheat would have on 
the interstate market. Id. at 2227.  
 63. Id. at 2226.  
 64. Id. at 2229.  
 65. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 66. Id. at 2231.   
 67. Id. at 2232. 
 68. Id. at 2235.  
 69. Id. at 2233.  
 70. Id.  
 71. Id.  
 72. Id. at 2234.  
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 In summary, the majority rejected the Ninth Circuit’s assertion 
that respondents’ activities were a “separate and distinct class of ac-
tivities.”73 The two strong dissents showed that the definition of the 
class of activities at issue is determinative of the resulting Commerce 
Clause analysis. According to the majority, the fact that respondents’ 
use was for medical purposes, or within the boundaries of California 
state law, was insufficient to remove respondents’ activities from the 
reach of the CSA. The Supreme Court, relying on Wickard74 and 
other recent Commerce Clause precedent, held Congress has the au-
thority to prohibit the “ ‘intrastate, noncommercial cultivation, pos-
session and use of marijuana.’ ”75 Thus, despite efforts by California 
and other states to allow the use of marijuana for medical purposes 
in accordance with state law, medical marijuana users are still sub-
ject to federal enforcement under the CSA. In order to permit the 
medical use of marijuana, Congress will have to reclassify it from 
Schedule I to another schedule under the CSA. “But perhaps even 
more important than these legal avenues is the democratic process, 
in which the voices of voters allied with these respondents may one 
day be heard in the halls of Congress.”76                   
TORTS—CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—FLORIDA SUPREME COURT HOLDS 
“COMMERCIAL PURPOSE,” AS USED IN FLORIDA’S COMMERCIAL 
MISAPPROPRIATION STATUTE, DOES NOT APPLY TO A MOTION PICTURE 
THAT DOES NOT DIRECTLY PROMOTE A PRODUCT OR SERVICE—Tyne v. 
Time Warner Entertainment Co. (Tyne III), 901 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 2005) 
 The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals presented a certified ques-
tion to the Florida Supreme Court asking the court to determine the 
extent to which section 540.08, Florida Statutes,77 applied to the facts 
                                                                                                                      
 73. Id. at 2215 (majority opinion). 
  74. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
 75. Raich II, 125 S. Ct. at 2215 (quoting Raich v. Ashcroft (Raich I), 352 F.3d 1222, 
1229 (9th Cir. 2003)). 
 76. Id.  
 77. Section 540.08, Florida Statutes, which is entitled “[u]nauthorized publication of 
name or likeness,” provides:  
  (1) No person shall publish, print, display or otherwise publicly use for pur-
poses of trade or for any commercial or advertising purpose the name, portrait, 
photograph, or other likeness of any natural person without the express writ-
ten or oral consent to such use given by: 
(a) Such person; or 
(b) Any other person, firm or corporation authorized in writing by such person 
to license the commercial use of her or his name or likeness; or 
(c) If such person is deceased, any person, firm or corporation authorized in 
writing to license the commercial use of her or his name or likeness, or if no 
person, firm or corporation is so authorized, then by any one from among a 
class composed of her or his surviving spouse and surviving children. 
  (2) In the event the consent required in subsection (1) is not obtained, the per-
son whose name, portrait, photograph, or other likeness is so used, or any per-
son, firm, or corporation authorized by such person in writing to license the 
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of the case before the Eleventh Circuit.78 The court used its discre-
tionary jurisdiction under article 5, section 3, subsection (b)(6) of the 
Florida Constitution to review the case.79 With the Eleventh Circuit’s 
permission, the Florida Supreme Court rephrased the issue as fol-
lows: “Does the phrase ‘for purposes of trade or for any commercial or 
advertising purpose’ in section 540.08(1), Florida Statutes, include 
publications which do not directly promote a product or service?”80 In 
this case of first impression, a divided81 Florida Supreme Court con-
                                                                                                                      
commercial use of her or his name or likeness, or, if the person whose likeness 
is used is deceased, any person, firm, or corporation having the right to give 
such consent, as provided hereinabove, may bring an action to enjoin such un-
authorized publication, printing, display or other public use, and to recover 
damages for any loss or injury sustained by reason thereof, including an 
amount which would have been a reasonable royalty, and punitive or exem-
plary damages. 
  (3) The provisions of this section shall not apply to: 
(a) The publication, printing, display, or use of the name or likeness of any per-
son in any newspaper, magazine, book, news broadcast or telecast, or other 
news medium or publication as part of any bona fide news report or presenta-
tion having a current and legitimate public interest and where such name or 
likeness is not used for advertising purposes; 
(b) The use of such name, portrait, photograph, or other likeness in connection 
with the resale or other distribution of literary, musical, or artistic productions 
or other articles of merchandise or property where such person has consented 
to the use of her or his name, portrait, photograph, or likeness on or in connec-
tion with the initial sale or distribution thereof; or 
(c) Any photograph of a person solely as a member of the public and where such 
person is not named or otherwise identified in or in connection with the use of 
such photograph. 
  (4) No action shall be brought under this section by reason of any publication, 
printing, display, or other public use of the name or likeness of a person occur-
ring after the expiration of 40 years from and after the death of such person. 
  (5) As used in this section, a person’s “surviving spouse” is the person’s surviv-
ing spouse under the law of her or his domicile at the time of her or his death, 
whether or not the spouse has later remarried; and a person’s “children” are 
her or his immediate offspring and any children legally adopted by the person. 
Any consent provided for in subsection (1) shall be given on behalf of a minor 
by the guardian of her or his person or by either parent. 
  (6) The remedies provided for in this section shall be in addition to and not in 
limitation of the remedies and rights of any person under the common law 
against the invasion of her or his privacy. 
FLA. STAT. § 540.08 (2005). 
 78. Tyne v. Time Warner Entm’t Co. (Tyne III), 901 So. 2d 802, 803 (Fla. 2005) (em-
phasis omitted) (certifying the following question: “To what extent does section 540.08 of 
the Florida Statutes apply to the facts of the case?”). This case reached the Eleventh Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals when Tyne appealed a decision by the Florida Middle District, in 
which the court granted the motion for summary judgment on all claims of appellees. Id. at 
805; see Tyne ex rel. Tyne v. Time Warner Entm’t Co. (Tyne I), 204 F. Supp. 2d 1338 (M.D. 
Fla. 2002).  
 79. Tyne III, 901 So. 2d at 803 (citing FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(6)).  
 80. Id. at 806 (emphasis omitted). 
 81. Justice Lewis dissented but did not issue an opinion. Id. at 810. 
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cluded the phrase does not include publications, “including motion 
pictures,” that do not directly promote a product or service.82 
 Tyne and other appellants brought the original action in the Mid-
dle District of Florida83 under Florida’s commercial misappropriation 
law84 after Warner Bros. released the film The Perfect Storm,85 which 
was based upon the story of a fishing vessel caught in a storm off the 
coast of New England. Crewmembers, who were family members of 
appellants, were presumed dead after the boat went missing. Both 
the crewmembers and their surviving family members, who were 
parties to this action, were portrayed in the film. Before the movie, 
Sebastian Junger wrote a book86 about the event based on the exten-
sive media reports and interviews. Without seeking permission or of-
fering compensation to the family members, Warner Bros. bought the 
rights from Junger to produce the movie, which was a concededly 
more dramatized account than the book.87 
 The court, like the federal district court, discussed and approved 
the analysis of section 540.08, Florida Statutes, by the Fourth Dis-
trict Court of Appeals in Loft v. Fuller.88 The Loft court held the stat-
ute’s purpose was to prevent the “unauthorized use of a name to di-
rectly promote the product or service of the publisher.”89 It added 
that the statute is aimed to prevent harm that occurs when an indi-
vidual’s name or likeness is associated with something else.90 Al-
though making money through the sales of a movie is commercial, it 
“simply does not amount to the kind of commercial exploitation pro-
hibited by the statute.”91 
 In another referenced case, Lane v. MRA Holdings, LLC, the Mid-
dle District of Florida followed the same reasoning as the Loft court.92 
                                                                                                                      
 82. Id. 
 83. See Tyne I, 204 F. Supp. 2d at 1341 (explaining that a motion picture in and of it-
self is not a commercial purpose). The district court drew a distinction between using a 
name for trade and advertising, which is actionable, versus using a name in a publication, 
which is not actionable. Id. at 1341. 
 84. FLA. STAT. § 540.08 (2000). 
 85. THE PERFECT STORM (Warner Bros. 2000). The appellees in the case were Time 
Warner Entertainment Company, L.P., d/b/a Warner Bros. Pictures. Tyne III, 901 So. 2d at 
803 n.1. 
 86. SEBASTIAN JUNGER, THE PERFECT STORM: A TRUE STORY OF MEN AGAINST THE 
SEA (1997). 
 87. Tyne III, 901 So. 2d at 804. Warner Bros. indicated at the beginning of the movie 
“THIS FILM IS BASED ON A TRUE STORY,” but also included a disclaimer in the closing 
credits: “Dialogue and certain events and characters in the film were created for the pur-
pose of fictionalization.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).  
 88. Id. at 806, 810 (citing Loft v. Fuller, 408 So. 2d 619 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)). 
 89. 408 So. 2d at 622-23. 
 90. Id. at 623. 
 91. Id. 
 92. 242 F. Supp. 2d 1205 (M.D. Fla. 2002) (considering whether section 540.08, Flor-
ida Statutes, was violated by defendant’s display of plaintiff exposing her breasts in a Girls 
Gone Wild video after plaintiff signed letter of consent).  
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Additionally, it based its conclusion upon the definition of “the pur-
poses of trade” found in section 47 of the Restatement (Third) of Un-
fair Competition:  
The names, likeness, and other indicia of a person’s identity are 
used “for the purposes of trade” . . . if they are used in advertising 
the user’s goods or services, or are placed on merchandise mar-
keted by the user, or are used in connection with services rendered 
by the user. However, use “for the purpose of trade” does not ordi-
narily include the use of a person’s identity in news reporting, 
commentary, entertainment, works of fiction or nonfiction, or in 
advertising incidental to such uses. . . . [U]se of another’s identity 
in a novel, play, or motion picture is . . . not ordinarily an in-
fringement . . . [unless] the name or likeness is used solely to at-
tract attention to a work that is not related to the identified person 
. . . .93 
The court in Lane concluded that the video at issue was an “expres-
sive work,” which never showed the individual endorsing or promot-
ing the product; so it was not a violation of the statute.94 
 Based upon the reasoning in both Lane and Loft, the Florida Su-
preme Court held that “the purpose of section 540.08 is to prevent 
the use of a person’s name or likeness to directly promote a product 
or service because of the way that the use associates the person’s 
name or personality with something else.”95 Thus, The Perfect Storm 
did not violate Florida’s commercial misappropriation statute. 
 As it rejected the broader expansion of the statute, the court re-
sponded to the arguments proposed by appellants. It stated that, con-
trary to the appellants’ arguments, the exceptions in sections 
540.08(3)(a) and (b), Florida Statutes, are not superfluous under this 
construction.96 Regarding subsection (3)(a), “[a]pplying the statute to 
only those situations that ‘directly promote a product or service’ does 
not necessarily mean that the use is in an advertisement.”97  
 Furthermore, the resale exemption in subsection (3)(b) does not 
only apply to such limited circumstances as appellants contend.98 In-
stead, it allows retailers to promote and advertise by using names 
and likenesses of artists and celebrities whose works they are sell-
                                                                                                                      
 93. Id. at 1213 (alterations in original) (citations omitted). 
 94. Id. at 1215 (“Lane’s lawsuit arose from an expressive work that has no purpose 
other than to entertain a segment of the general population.”). 
 95. Tyne v. Time Warner Entm’t Co. (Tyne III), 901 So. 2d 802, 808 (Fla. 2005). 
 96. Id. at 808. 
 97. The court cited Ewing v. A-1 Management, Inc., 481 So. 2d 99 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986), 
for an example of a name falling within the scope of section 540.08, but exempted under 
the newsworthiness exception in subsection (3)(a). Id. Thus, the subsection served a practi-
cal function and was not redundant. Id. 
 98. Id. 
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ing.99 “The exemption does not simply authorize the resale of the ex-
empted works themselves.”100 
 In addition to agreeing with the construction of the statute in the 
cases previously discussed, the court also proposed two supporting 
arguments for its conclusion. The first was the silence of the legisla-
ture in response to cases such as Loft.101 The failure to amend the 
statute in response to the decisions may be viewed as “legislative ac-
ceptance or approval of the judicial construction of the statute.”102  
 Second, the court addressed the constitutional issue regarding the 
First Amendment if motion pictures and similar works were defined 
within “commercial purpose.”103 It quoted the Supreme Court state-
ment, also quoted by Judge Conway in the lower court decision, that 
“books, newspapers, and magazines are published and sold for profit 
does not prevent them from being a form of expression whose liberty 
is safeguarded by the First Amendment.”104 Similarly, a Pennsyl-
vania court discussing the same First Amendment issue with regard 
to commercial misappropriation and motion pictures concluded that 
works of artistic expression are provided greater protection by the 
First Amendment than commercial speech.105 Another case from the 
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals “recognized that an ‘expressive work’ 
protected by the First Amendment was not commercial speech be-
cause commercial speech is best understood as speech that merely 
advertises a product or service for business purposes.”106 
 The Florida Supreme Court drew two conclusions based upon 
these cases: (1) the common usage of “commercial” in commercial 
misappropriation statutes is limited to promotion of a product or ser-
vice, and (2) motion pictures are protected by the First Amend-
ment.107 Thus, because a court must give constitutional construction 
to a statute where it is possible, the court’s statutory construction, 
which avoided First Amendment challenges, was appropriate.108  
 The court ultimately answered the rephrased certified question in 
the negative but noted that the question presented was narrow.109 It 
cautioned that the decision did not preclude other claims by appel-
                                                                                                                      
 99. Id. 
 100. Id.  
 101. Id. There have been no amendments to the statute since 1967 except to rephrase 
it in gender-neutral terms. Id. 
 102. Id. (citing Goldenberg v. Sawczak, 791 So. 2d 1078, 1083 (Fla. 2001)). 
 103. Tyne III, 901 So. 2d at 808. 
 104. Id. at 809 (quoting Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952)). 
 105. Id. (citing Seale v. Gramercy Pictures, 949 F. Supp. 331 (E.D. Pa. 1996)). 
 106. Id. (citing Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959 
(10th Cir. 1996)). 
 107. Id. at 810. 
 108. Id.  
 109. Id. 
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lants under statutory or common law.110 However, the motion picture, 
The Perfect Storm, did not violate Florida’s law prohibiting commer-
cial misappropriation.111  
AGRICULTURE—FLORIDA SUPREME COURT HOLDS HOMEOWNERS MAY 
RECEIVE COMPENSATION FOR STATE’S DESTRUCTION OF HEALTHY, 
RESIDENTIAL CITRUS TREES UNDER REMEDIAL STATUTE AND AVOIDS 
DECIDING INVERSE CONDEMNATION CLAIM—Patchen v. Florida De-
partment of Agriculture & Consumer Services (Patchen II), 906 So. 2d 
1005 (Fla. 2005) 
 Inverse condemnation is “a cause of action against a governmental 
defendant to recover the value of property which has been taken in 
fact by the governmental defendant, even though no formal exercise 
of the power of eminent domain has been attempted by the taking 
agency.”112 Since 1957,113 the Florida Supreme Court has increasingly 
narrowed its interpretation of the law in favor of the State when it 
comes to compensating property owners for the destruction of citrus 
trees in the State’s effort to eradicate crop-destroying disease.114 The 
court’s recent decision in Patchen v. Florida Department of Agricul-
ture & Consumer Services (Patchen II),115 the latest in this line of tak-
ings claims, seems to divert from this trend. However, whether in-
tentionally or not, the court may have still implicitly narrowed the 
options for petitioners and those similarly situated by denying a 
common law cause of action.116  
                                                                                                                      
 110. Id. (implying this ruling did not make a judgment on other related claims brought 
by plaintiffs, such as a violation of relational right to privacy as discussed by the Eleventh 
Circuit, see Tyne v. Time Warner Entm’t Co. (Tyne II), 336 F.3d 1286, 1291 (11th Cir. 
2003), and false light invasion of privacy discussed by the Middle District Court of Florida, 
see Tyne ex rel. Tyne v. Time Warner Entm’t Co. (Tyne I), 204 F. Supp. 2d 1338, 1343 (M.D. 
Fla. 2002)). 
 111. Id. 
 112. Patchen v. Fla. Dep’t of Agric. & Consumer Servs. (Patchen II), 906 So. 2d 1005, 
1012 (Fla. 2005) (Quince, J., dissenting) (quoting Kirkpatrick v. City of Jacksonville, Dep’t 
of Hous. & Urban Dev., 312 So. 2d 487, 488 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975)). 
 113. Corneal v. State Plant Bd., 95 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1957) (holding that while the Plant 
Board validly exercised its police power in destroying trees to prevent the “spreading de-
cline” disease, the owners were entitled to compensation).  
 114. See Haire v. Fla. Dep’t of Agric. & Consumer Servs., 870 So. 2d 774 (Fla. 2004) 
(upholding the State’s ability to deprive citizens of private property pursuant to its police 
power); Dep’t of Agric. & Consumer Servs. v. Polk, 568 So. 2d 35 (Fla. 1990) (holding that 
the State’s destruction of diseased trees and those within 125 feet of the diseased tree was 
not a taking but that trees outside the 125-foot radius were eligible for compensation); 
Dep’t of Agric. & Consumer Servs. v. Mid-Florida Growers, Inc., 521 So. 2d 101 (Fla. 1988) 
(holding that while the State validly exercised its police power in destroying trees to pre-
vent the spread of citrus canker, the State’s actions constituted a taking and required just 
compensation for the owners). 
 115. 906 So. 2d 1005 (Fla. 2005). 
 116. Id. at 1009 (Lewis, J., concurring in result only). Justice Lewis disagreed with the 
majority’s intentional avoidance of discussing common law rights and the implication that 
petitioners’ only remedy is pursuant to section 581.1845, Florida Statutes, which attempts 
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 The Patchens brought their inverse condemnation claim when, in 
October 2000, their healthy, residential citrus trees were destroyed 
by the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services (“Depart-
ment”).117 The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the 
Department based upon evidence that the Patchens’ trees were lo-
cated within 1900 feet of a diseased tree and, therefore, exposed to 
citrus canker.118 The Third District, relying on an earlier Florida Su-
preme Court decision in Department of Agriculture & Consumer Ser-
vices v. Polk, affirmed and held that the Patchens were not entitled 
to compensation in an inverse condemnation claim because “[s]uch 
property is incapable of any lawful use, it is of no value, and it is a 
source of public danger.”119 
 The Third District then certified a question to the Florida Su-
preme Court, asking whether Polk, which held that destroying 
healthy, commercial citrus trees did not compel compensation from 
the State, applied in this type of case, where the State destroyed 
healthy, residential, noncommercial citrus trees.120 Answering the 
certified question in the negative,121 the majority found the applica-
tion of section 581.1845(2), Florida Statutes, and Haire v. Florida 
Department of Agriculture & Consumer Services122 controlling.123 In a 
concurring opinion, Chief Justice Pariente reasoned that holding the 
statute applicable under the circumstances of this case eliminated 
the need to litigate whether petitioners’ trees were a nuisance or pre-
sented an imminent danger.124 
 The court’s decision in Patchen is apparently grounded in the idea 
that remedial statutes are excepted from the general rule against 
retrospective application of statutes.125 In 2002, the Citrus Canker 
Law was amended to include those trees located within 1900 feet of 
an infected tree as being exposed to infection and to allow the de-
                                                                                                                      
to retroactively provide a statutory right of “compensation to eligible homeowners whose 
citrus trees have been removed under a citrus canker eradication program.” Id.  
 117. Id. at 1006 (majority opinion). On October 31, 2000, agents of the State of Florida 
destroyed six healthy, mature, fruit-laden citrus trees. Id. Canker-infested trees were al-
legedly found within 1900 feet of the Patchens’ property by trained pathologists. Id.  
 118. Id. 
 119. Patchen v. Fla. Dep’t of Agric. & Consumer Servs. (Patchen I), 817 So. 2d 854, 855 
(Fla. 3d DCA 2002) (quoting Dep’t of Agric. & Consumer Servs. v. Polk, 568 So. 2d 35, 40 
n.4 (Fla. 1990)). In Polk, the trial court noted that the diseased trees and those trees 
within 125 feet of the diseased trees had no marketable value and ruled that Polk need not 
be compensated for those trees. 568 So. 2d at 37. 
 120. Patchen I, 817 So. 2d at 855-56. 
 121. Patchen II, 906 So. 2d at 1006. 
 122. 870 So. 2d 774 (Fla. 2004). 
 123. Patchen II, 906 So. 2d at 1008. 
 124. Id. at 1009 (Pariente, C.J., concurring). Chief Justice Pariente explained that the 
Patchens, as well as similarly situated homeowners, are in a better position than if the 
court were to hold that they have a right to an inverse condemnation claim. Id. 
 125. See Village of El Portal v. City of Miami Shores, 362 So. 2d 275, 278 (Fla. 1978). 
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struction of all infected and exposed trees.126 Further, section 
581.1845, Florida Statutes, was added to provide reimbursement to 
certain homeowners whose citrus trees have been removed as part of 
the eradication program.127 In a per curiam opinion, the Florida Su-
preme Court found that petitioners, whose cause of action arose prior 
to the 2002 addition of section 581.1845(2), Florida Statutes, were 
eligible to receive compensation based on the destruction of unin-
fected, healthy, noncommercial citrus trees located within 1900 feet 
of a tree infected with citrus canker.128 However, by avoiding the dis-
cussion of common law rights and by failing to explicitly find the 
Third District Court of Appeal’s summary denial of the Patchens’ in-
verse condemnation claim erroneous, the court may have implicitly 
denied the Patchens a vested right to pursue such a claim.129  
 The court has traditionally recognized that the presumption in fa-
vor of prospective application generally does not apply to “remedial” 
legislation, and such legislation should be applied to pending cases 
only when necessary to effectuate the legislation’s intended pur-
pose.130 With this recognition, the court apparently determined the 
2002 legislation to be simply procedural rather than substantive. The 
court has refused in the past to classify a statute that accomplishes a 
remedial purpose by either creating substantive new rights or impos-
ing new legal burdens as that type of “remedial” legislation that 
should be presumptively applied in pending cases.131 
 In Polk, a similar inverse condemnation claim, the trial court 
found, based on substantial competent evidence, that those trees ac-
tually diseased, as well as those within 125 feet of a diseased tree, 
had no marketable value.132 Thus, destroying both diseased and ex-
                                                                                                                      
 126. Act effective July 1, 2005, ch. 02-11, § 1, 2002 Fla. Laws 310, 311 (codified at FLA. 
STAT. § 581.184 (2005)). The initial buffer zone was 125 feet from an infected tree, but that 
distance was not adequate in preventing the spread of citrus canker. Haire, 870 So. 2d at 
778. Consequently, the Department recommended a 1900-foot removal radius. Id. at 779.   
 127. Act effective July 1, 2001, ch. 01-254, § 45, 2001 Fla. Laws 2699, 2699 (codified at 
FLA. STAT. § 581.1845 (2001)). Section 581.1845, Florida Statutes, states: 
To be eligible to receive compensation under this program, a homeowner must: 
(a) Be the homeowner of record on the date the trees were removed from the 
residential property as part of a citrus canker eradication program; 
(b) Have had one or more citrus trees removed from the property by a tree-
cutting contractor as part of a citrus canker eradication program on or after 
January 1, 1995; and 
(c) Have received no commercial compensation and is not eligible to receive 
commercial compensation from the United States Department of Agriculture 
for citrus trees removed as part of a citrus canker eradication program. 
FLA. STAT. § 581.1845 (2005). 
 128. Patchen II, 906 So. 2d at 1005. 
 129. Id. at 1110 (Quince, J., dissenting). 
 130. See Arrow Air, Inc. v. Walsh, 645 So. 2d 422, 424 (Fla. 1994); City of Orlando v. 
Desjardins, 493 So. 2d 1027, 1028 (Fla. 1986).   
 131. Patchen II, 906 So. 2d at 1110 (Quince, J., dissenting). 
 132. Dep’t of Agric. & Consumer Servs. v. Polk, 568 So. 2d 35, 38 (Fla. 1990). 
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posed trees within the 125-foot radius did not constitute a taking re-
quiring compensation.133 However, in upholding the trial court’s deci-
sion, the Florida Supreme Court went one step further to require 
compensation for those healthy trees outside the 125-foot radius.134 
 Analyzed under Polk, as the Third District did, the Patchens 
would have no inverse condemnation cause of action. The Depart-
ment destroyed trees within the 1900-foot radius, which was allowed 
under the statute. However, because there was no record from which 
to determine whether substantial competent evidence supported the 
determination that the Patchens’ destroyed trees were without value, 
the court appropriately found Polk inapplicable.135 
 By applying Haire, however, the court retroactively applied case 
law. Although Haire supports the conclusion that a homeowner may 
seek compensation in addition to that offered by the 2002 statute, 
neither the decision nor the statute existed until after the Patchens 
filed their claim.136 
 The 2002 statute provided for compensation to certain homeown-
ers whose residential trees were destroyed under the Citrus Canker 
Law on or after January 1, 1995, and the court found that the 2002 
statute clearly intended to include the Patchens’ 2000 cause of ac-
tion.137 This seems to be at odds with the court’s prior determination 
that “it cannot be reasoned that a statutory change that affects and 
changes the measure of damages is merely ‘remedial’ and thus, pro-
cedural, and, therefore is not a change in the substantive law giving 
the substantive right which is the basis for the damages.”138 If one 
reasons that the 2002 statute creates a new right to recover compen-
sation, then the court clearly departed from its precedent by retroac-
tively applying the 2002 statute.  
 Perhaps the more appropriate alternative, as suggested by Justice 
Quince’s dissenting opinion, would have been to quash the Third Dis-
trict’s opinion and remand for an evidentiary hearing. If such were 
the case, the Patchens could have proven the value of their destroyed 
trees, if any, and been entitled to a factual finding on damages. As it 
stands, the Florida Supreme Court’s application of a statute and case 
law that were not in existence at the time the Patchens’ cause of ac-
tion arose leaves the residents of Florida wondering if a common law 
right exists and sets the legislature up to abrogate the right to com-
pensation as easily as it granted it.  
                                                                                                                      
 133. Id. at 43. 
 134. Id.  
 135. Patchen II, 906 So. 2d, 1008-09 (majority opinion). 
 136. Id. at 1011 (Quince, J., dissenting).  
 137. Id. at 1008 (majority opinion).  
 138. L. Ross, Inc. v. R.W. Roberts Constr. Co., 481 So. 2d 484, 485 (Fla. 1986) (quoting 
L. Ross, Inc. v. R.W. Roberts Constr. Co., 466 So. 2d 1096, 1098 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985)).  
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CIVIL PROCEDURE—FLORIDA SUPREME COURT HOLDS IN AN ACTION 
FOR BAD FAITH AGAINST AN INSURANCE COMPANY, WORK-PRODUCT 
PRIVILEGE DOES NOT PROTECT MATERIALS PREPARED THROUGH THE 
DATE OF THE RESOLUTION OF THE UNDERLYING CLAIM FOR 
COVERAGE—Allstate Indemnity Co. v. Ruiz, 899 So. 2d 1121 (Fla. 
2005) 
 The Florida Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction to resolve a con-
flict among the district courts of appeal on what materials are dis-
coverable in a first-party insurance bad faith action.139 The Fourth 
District Court of Appeal recently held “the key inquiry is whether the 
probability of litigation is ‘substantial and imminent.’ ”140 This deci-
sion conflicted with the decisions of other districts, which have found 
that documents are protected by the work-product privilege when 
prepared at a time when litigation is foreseeable.141 Since litigation 
with an insurer is arguably foreseeable from the time of an incident 
giving rise to a claim, the work-product privilege has effectively pro-
tected most of an insurer’s documents, including the contents of the 
claims file in other districts.142 
 In Ruiz, the plaintiffs, Joaquin and Paulina Ruiz, purchased 
automobile insurance coverage from the defendant, Allstate Indem-
nity Company (“Allstate”), for a Chevrolet Blazer that was mistak-
enly deleted from the policy one month later.143 Thus, the plaintiffs 
were unaware the Blazer was uninsured.144 Plaintiff Joaquin Ruiz 
was subsequently involved in an accident in the Blazer and filed a 
claim for collision coverage.145 Initially, Allstate denied coverage be-
cause the Blazer was not included on the insurance policy.146 How-
ever, Allstate extended coverage on the Blazer a month later, after 
plaintiffs filed a bad faith action.147 
 After the coverage issue was resolved, the plaintiffs moved to 
compel production of the claim and investigative files, internal 
manuals, the insurance agent’s files, and other documents.148 The 
trial court conducted an in camera inspection and found that no at-
                                                                                                                      
 139. Allstate Indem.  Co. v. Ruiz, 899 So. 2d 1121, 1122 (Fla. 2005). 
 140. Allstate Indem. Co. v. Ruiz, 780 So. 2d 239, 241 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (citing 
Carver v. Allstate Ins. Co., 94 F.R.D. 131 (S.D. Ga. 1982), quashed, 899 So. 2d 1121 (Fla. 
2005).  
 141. See Vesta Fire Ins. v. Figueroa, 821 So. 2d 1233 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002); Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc. v. Ballasso, 789 So. 2d 519 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001); Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. 
Fla. Dep’t of Ins., 694 So. 2d 772 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997); Anchor Nat’l Fin. Servs., Inc. v. 
Smeltz, 546 So. 2d 760 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). 
 142. See cases supra note 141. 
 143. Ruiz, 899 So. 2d at 1123.  
 144. Id. 
 145. Id.  
 146. Id.  
 147. Id.  
 148. Id.   
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torney-client or work-product privilege applied to the requested 
documents.149 On appeal, Allstate argued that since there was an is-
sue with coverage immediately, litigation was an instant possibil-
ity.150 Thus, according to Allstate, all documents, including the claims 
file, were prepared in anticipation of litigation and protected by the 
work-product privilege.151 However, “the claim file type material pre-
sents virtually the only source of direct evidence with regard to the 
essential issue of the insurance company’s handling of the insured’s 
claim.”152  
 The Fourth District Court of Appeal distinguished between “mate-
rial prepared during the normal course of evaluating a claim and ma-
terials actually prepared ‘in anticipation of litigation.’ ”153 Therefore, 
the Fourth District Court of Appeal upheld the order to produce the 
statement of the insurance agent, an internal memorandum from the 
insurance adjuster, and some computer diaries.154 However, materi-
als in the claim file and other documents were found to be prepared 
“in anticipation of litigation” and protected by the work-product 
privilege.155 
 On review, the Florida Supreme Court reasoned that the conflict 
among the districts stemmed from an artificial distinction between 
first- and third-party bad faith actions.156 In an action by a third 
party against an insured, the insurance company defends the insured 
and thus owes the insured a fiduciary duty to handle the claim in 
good faith.157 However, in Kujawa v. Manhattan National Life Insur-
ance Co., the Florida Supreme Court, affirming a decision by the 
Fourth District Court of Appeal, previously held that in a first-party 
bad faith action, an adversarial, not a fiduciary, relationship exists 
between parties.158 Therefore, pursuant to Kujawa, the adversarial 
relationship in a first-party bad faith action precluded discovery of 
materials protected by the attorney-client and work-product privi-
leges.159 To the contrary, in a third-party bad faith action, “all mate-
rials, including documents, memoranda and letters, contained in the 
                                                                                                                      
 149. Id. 
 150. Id.   
 151. Id.  
 152. Id. 
 153. Allstate Indem. Co. v. Ruiz, 780 So. 2d 239, 241 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). 
 154. Id. at 240.  
 155. Id. at 241. 
 156. Ruiz, 899 So. 2d at 1129. The supreme court receded from its earlier decision Ku-
jawa v. Manhattan National Life Insurance Co., 541 So. 2d 1168 (Fla. 1989), which created 
the distinction. 
 157. Ruiz, 899 So. 2d at 1125; see also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Laforet, 658 
So. 2d 55, 58 (Fla. 1995). 
 158. 541 So. 2d at 1169.  
 159. Id.   
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insurance company’s file, up to and including the date of judgment in 
the original litigation, should be produced.”160  
 Another common distinction is in a third-party bad faith action, 
“[a]s a third party beneficiary of the insurance policy, [the injured 
third party] stands in the same posture as that of . . . the insured.”161 
Since the insured and insurer were represented by the same attor-
neys in the original action, the insured, and therefore the injured 
third party, is “entitled to discovery, including deposition and pro-
duction of files by the attorneys.”162 The last distinction analogizes 
the injured third party to a judgment creditor. If the insurance com-
pany fails to resolve a third-party claim for less than the policy limit, 
the insured is exposed to the excess liability. If the insured is judg-
ment proof, the injured third party can bring a bad faith action di-
rectly against the insurance company because the third party is the 
“real party in interest in a position similar to that of a ‘judgment 
creditor.’ ”163 
 Section 624.155, Florida Statutes, eliminated the distinction be-
tween first- and third-party bad faith actions. “Any person may bring 
a civil action” if the insurer does not attempt “in good faith to settle 
claims when, under all the circumstances, it could and should have 
done so, had it acted fairly and honestly toward its insured and with 
due regard for her or his interests.”164   
 However, in Kujawa, the Florida Supreme Court held the “legisla-
ture in creating the bad faith cause of action did not evince an intent 
to abolish the attorney-client privilege and work-product immu-
nity.”165 Therefore, the Florida Supreme Court expressly receded 
from its decision in Kujawa166 “because it has unnecessarily produced 
the application of artificial and disparate discovery rules to first- and 
third-party bad faith actions.”167 
 Further, the Florida Supreme Court reiterated the distinction be-
tween actions brought by an insured based on a claim for coverage 
                                                                                                                      
 160. Ruiz, 899 So. 2d at 1126 (quoting Stone v. Travelers Ins. Co., 326 So. 2d 241, 243 
(Fla. 3d DCA 1976)).  
 161. Id. at 1127 (quoting Boston Old Colony Ins. Co. v. Gutierrez, 325 So. 2d 416, 417 
(Fla. 3d DCA 1976)). 
 162. Id. 
 163. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Laforet, 658 So. 2d 55, 58 (Fla. 1995). 
 164. FLA. STAT. § 624.155(1)(b)1 (2004).  
 165. Kujawa v. Manhattan Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 541 So. 2d 1168, 1169 (Fla. 1989). 
 166. Justice Wells dissented to receding from the decision in Kujawa because he as-
serted that there remains an adversarial relationship between the insured and insurer. 
Thus, “the insurer must have the right to defend the claim without work product of the at-
torney for the insurer being subject to discovery while the claim remains pending.” Ruiz, 
899 So. 2d at 1132 (Wells, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
 167. Id. at 1129 (majority opinion). The court also expressly agreed with the analysis in 
Fidelity & Casualty Insurance Co. of New York v. Taylor, 525 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 3d DCA 
1987).  
2005]                          RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 351 
 
and the bad faith action.168 Some materials, including the claim file, 
contain information that may be protected by the attorney-client or 
work-product privileges in the underlying claim dispute. However, 
materials prepared after the initiation of the bad faith action are 
subject to the traditional rules of discovery and the work-product 
privilege.169 “[L]itigants who choose to file both actions simultane-
ously must recognize that certain documentation relevant to the bad 
faith action may not be available for discovery until after resolution 
of the [claim dispute].”170  
 Through the enactment of section 624.155, Florida Statutes, the 
legislature has imposed on the insurance companies the duty of good 
faith in handling the claims of both their insured and third parties.171 
According to the court:  
[I]n connection with evaluating the obligation to process claims in 
good faith under section 624.155, all materials, including docu-
ments, memoranda, and letters, contained in the underlying claim 
and related litigation file material that was created up to and in-
cluding the date of resolution of the underlying disputed matter 
and pertain in any way to coverage, benefits, liability, or damages, 
should also be produced in a first-party bad faith action.172 
Thus, the Florida Supreme Court expressly receded from Kujawa 
and held the same discovery rules apply to first- and third-party bad 
faith actions, because any distinction between the two types of action 
is artificial and overly formalistic. By eliminating this distinction, 
the Florida Supreme Court resolved the conflict among the districts 
on whether materials are protected by the work-product privilege if 
litigation is “substantial and imminent” or “merely foreseeable.” In 
light of this decision, all materials prepared through the date of the 
resolution of the underlying claim for coverage are discoverable in 
both first- and third-party bad faith actions.  
FLORIDA LEGISLATION—THE CONTROVERSY OVER FLORIDA’S NEW 
“STAND YOUR GROUND” LAW—FLA. STAT. § 776.013 (2005) 
 While several bills taken up for discussion during the 2005 Flor-
ida legislative session were controversial, the Judiciary Committee’s 
                                                                                                                      
 168. Justice Wells, with whom Justice Bell concurred, would draw a clear line and “not 
allow discovery in a bad faith lawsuit of the insurer’s file until the claim on the policy is 
completed. Once it is completed, then the entire file of the insurer is discoverable over the 
objection of work product.” Ruiz, 899 So. 2d at 1132 (Wells, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part).  
 169. Id.  
 170. Id. at 1130 (majority opinion) (citing Old Republic Nat’l Title Ins. Co. v. HomeAm-
erican Credit, Inc., 844 So. 2d 818 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) and Allstate Ins. Co. v. Shupack, 
335 So.2d 620 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)).  
 171. Id.  at 1128.  
 172. Id. at 1129-30.  
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Committee Substitute for Senate Bill 436173 is, perhaps, at the top of 
the list. Inspiring newspaper articles such as those entitled Legisla-
                                                                                                                      
 173. The Judiciary Committee’s Committee Substitute for Senate Bill 436 creates sec-
tions 776.013 and 776.032, Florida Statutes. Section 776.013, Florida Statutes, entitled 
“Home protection; use of deadly force; presumption of fear of death or great bodily harm,” 
provides:  
  (1) A person is presumed to have held a reasonable fear of imminent peril of 
death or great bodily harm to himself or herself or another when using defen-
sive force that is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm to an-
other if:  
(a) The person against whom the defensive force was used was in the process of 
unlawfully and forcefully entering, or had unlawfully and forcibly entered, a 
dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle, or if that person had removed or was 
attempting to remove another against that person’s will from the dwelling, 
residence, or occupied vehicle; and  
(b) The person who uses defensive force knew or had reason to believe that an 
unlawful and forcible act was occurring or had occurred. 
  (2) The presumption set forth in subsection (1) does not apply if:  
(a) The person against whom the defensive force is used had the right to be in 
or is a lawful resident of the dwelling, residence, or vehicle, such as an owner, 
lessee, or titleholder, and there is not an injunction for protection from domes-
tic violence or a written pretrial supervision order of no contact against that 
person; or 
(b) The person or persons sought to be removed is a child or grandchild, or is 
otherwise in the lawful custody or under the lawful guardianship of, the person 
against whom the defensive force is used; or  
(c) The person who uses defensive force is engaged in an unlawful activity or is 
using the dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle to further an unlawful activ-
ity; or 
(d) The person against whom the defensive force is used is a law enforcement 
officer, as defined in s. 943.10(14), who enters or attempts to enter a dwelling, 
residence, or vehicle in the performance of his or her official duties and the offi-
cer identified himself or herself in accordance with any applicable law or the 
person using force knew or reasonably should have known that the person en-
tering or attempting to enter was a law enforcement officer.  
  (3) A person who is not engaged in an unlawful activity and who is attacked in 
any other place where he or she has a right to be has no duty to retreat and has 
the right to stand his or her ground and meet force with force, including deadly 
force if he or she reasonably believes it is necessary to do so to prevent death or 
great bodily harm to himself or another or to prevent the commission of a forci-
ble felony. 
  (4) A person who unlawfully and by force enters or attempts to enter a per-
son’s dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle is presumed to be doing so with 
the intent to commit an unlawful act involving force or violence. 
  (5) As used in this section, the term:  
(a) “Dwelling” means a building or conveyance of any kind, including any at-
tached porch, whether the building or conveyance is temporary or permanent, 
mobile or immobile, which has a roof over it, including a tent, and is designed 
to be occupied by people lodging therein at night. 
(b) “Residence” means a dwelling in which a person resides either temporarily 
or permanently or is visiting as an invited guest. 
(c) “Vehicle” means a conveyance of any kind, whether or not motorized, which 
is designed to transport people or property. 
FLA. STAT. § 776.013 (2005). 
 Section 776.032, Florida Statutes, entitled “Immunity from criminal prosecution and 
civil action for justifiable use of force,” provides:  
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ture Says Let the Force Be with You174 and drawing national atten-
tion,175 the battle over what is commonly referred to as Florida’s 
“stand your ground” bill,176 figuratively speaking, had many Floridi-
ans up in arms, debating the changes the proposed law would bring.  
 For many, the debate rages on. The new law took effect on Octo-
ber 1, 2005,177 and, in the words of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 
redefines justifiable use of force (self-defense): 
permits a person to use force, including deadly force, without fear 
of criminal prosecution or civil action for damages, against a per-
son who unlawfully and forcibly enters the person’s dwelling, resi-
                                                                                                                      
  (1) A person who uses force as permitted in s. 776.012, s. 776.013, or s. 
776.032 is justified in using such force and is immune from criminal prosecu-
tion and civil action for the use of such force, unless the person against whom 
force was used is a law enforcement officer, as defined in s. 943.10(14), who was 
acting in the performance of his or her official duties and the officer identified 
himself or herself in accordance with any applicable law or the person using 
force knew or reasonably should have known that the person was a law en-
forcement officer. As used in this subsection, the term “criminal prosecution” 
includes arresting, detaining in custody, and charging or prosecuting the de-
fendant. 
  (2) A law enforcement agency may use standard procedures for investigating 
the use of force as described in subsection (1), but the agency may not arrest 
the person for using force unless it determines that there is probable cause that 
the force that was used was unlawful. 
  (3) The court shall award reasonable attorney’s fees, court costs, compensa-
tion for loss of income, and all expenses incurred by the defendant in defense of 
any civil action brought by a plaintiff if the court finds that the defendant is 
immune from prosecution as provided in subsection (1).  
Id. § 776.032. 
 Additionally, the measure amends section 776.031, Florida Statutes, entitled “Use of 
force in defense of others,” in pertinent part to provide that “[a] person does not have a 
duty to retreat if the person is in a place where he or she has a right to be.” Id. § 776.031. 
Further, the measure amends section 776.012, Florida Statutes, entitled “use of force in de-
fense person,” in pertinent part to provide that a person is justified in the use of deadly 
force “and does not have a duty to retreat if . . . [h]e or she reasonably believes that such 
force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or herself or 
another or to prevent the commission of a forcible felony; or . . . [u]nder those circum-
stances permitted pursuant to s. 776.013.” Id. § 776.012. 
 174. Steve Bousquet, Legislature Says Let the Force Be With You, ST. PETE. TIMES, Apr. 
6, 2005, available at http://www.sptimes.com/2005/04/06/news_pf/State/ 
Legislature_says_let_.shtml.  
 175. See, e.g., Abby Goodnough, Florida Expands Right to Use Deadly Force in Self-
Defense, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2005, at A18 (noting a comment by Wayne LaPierre, Execu-
tive Vice President of the National Rifle Association (NRA), that the NRA will push for 
similar measures elsewhere); Talk of the Nation: Florida’s New Gun Law Loosens Curbs 
(NPR radio broadcast May 2, 2005) (featuring a discussion panel comprised of Leslie Clark, 
a political reporter from The Miami Herald; George Fletcher, a professor from Columbia 
Law School; Florida State Representative Dennis Baxley, a sponsor of the bill; and Florida 
State Representative Dan Gelber, an opponent of the bill).  
 176. See, e.g., Goodnough, supra note 175 (referencing the measure as the “stand your 
ground” bill).  
 177. Fla. S. Judiciary Comm., CS for SB 436 (2005) Staff Analysis 7 (Feb. 25, 2005) (on 
file with comm.) [hereinafter Judiciary Comm. SB 436 Staff Analysis] (“The bill takes ef-
fect on October 1, 2005.”). 
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dence, or occupied vehicle [and] abrogates the common law duty to 
retreat when attacked before using force, including deadly force in 
self-defense or defense of others.178 
 Before Florida’s stand your ground law, both Florida statutes and 
common law governed the instances in which a person could use 
force, including deadly force, in self-defense, or in the defense of oth-
ers.179 Pursuant to section 776.012, Florida Statutes, a person was 
justified in using force, other than deadly force, against another 
where the person reasonably believed force was necessary to defend 
himself or herself against another person’s imminent use of unlawful 
force.180 However, deadly force was not justified unless the person 
reasonably believed deadly force was necessary to prevent “imminent 
death or great bodily harm to himself or herself or another or to pre-
vent the imminent commission of a forcible felony.”181 Additionally, 
section 776.031, Florida Statutes, governed the instances in which a 
person was justified in using force, and in some instances deadly 
force, to protect property.182 Further, Florida common law recognized 
a “duty to retreat,” which required “a person acting in self-defense 
outside his or her home or workplace” to employ “every reasonable 
means to avoid the danger, including retreat, prior to using deadly 
force.”183 The “castle doctrine,” however, provided an exception from 
the duty to retreat before using deadly force where a person was at-
tacked in his or her home or workplace and reasonably believed that 
deadly force was necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily 
harm to himself or herself or another or the commission of a forcible 
felony.184  
                                                                                                                      
 178. Id. at 1.  
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. at 1-2 (citing FLA. STAT. § 776.012 (2004)).  
 181. Id. at 2 (citing FLA. STAT. § 776.012 (2004)). Further, section 776.085, Florida 
Statutes (2004), protected a person acting in self-defense from damages for personal injury 
or death of a person who sustained injuries while attempting a “forcible felony.”  
 182. Section 776.031, Florida Statutes, provides:  
A person is justified in the use of force, except deadly force, against another 
when and to the extent that the person reasonably believes that such conduct is 
necessary to prevent or terminate such other’s trespass on, or other tortious or 
criminal interference with, either real property other than a dwelling or per-
sonal property, lawfully in his or her possession or in the possession of another 
who is a member of his or her immediate family or household or of a person 
whose property he or she has a legal duty to protect. However, the person is 
justified in the use of deadly force only if he or she reasonably believes that 
such force is necessary to prevent the imminent commission of a forcible felony. 
FLA. STAT. § 776.031 (2004). 
 183. Judiciary Comm. SB 436 Staff Analysis, supra note 173, at 2 (citing Florida v. 
James, 867 So. 2d 414, 416 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003)). “The duty to retreat appears to stem from 
policy that ‘[h]uman life is precious, and deadly combat should be avoided if at all possible 
when imminent danger to oneself can be avoided.’ ” Id. 
 184. Id. at 3. However, an exception to the castle doctrine applies where a resident 
uses deadly force in his or her home against a fellow resident or guest, requiring a person 
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 The stand your ground law creates a presumption that the de-
fender, in his or her home, a temporary place of lodging, or in a vehi-
cle, “has a reasonable fear of imminent death or great bodily harm” 
when the intruder unlawfully or forcibly enters.185 It additionally 
“presumes that the intruder intends to commit an unlawful act in-
volving force of violence.”186 The above “conclusive”187 presumptions 
“protect the defender from civil and criminal prosecution for unlawful 
use of force or deadly force in self-defense.”188 However, the presump-
tion concerning the intent of the intruder does not apply where the 
intruder (1) has a right to be in the home, place of temporary lodging, 
or vehicle;189 (2) seeks to lawfully remove a person under his or her 
care from a home, place of temporary lodging, or vehicle; or (3) is a 
law enforcement officer, acting lawfully, and the defender knew or 
had reason to know that the intruder was a law enforcement offi-
cer.190 Thus, Florida’s stand your ground law effectively:    
expands the castle doctrine by expanding the concept of what is a 
“castle” and by expanding the group of persons entitled to the cas-
tle’s protection. Under the castle doctrine, a person has no duty to 
retreat from his or her “castle,” a person’s home or workplace, be-
fore resorting to deadly force necessary for self-defense. [Florida’s 
Stand Your Ground Law] expand[s] the concept of the castle to in-
clude attached porches, any type of vehicle, and place of temporary 
lodging, including tents. Under the castle doctrine, only persons 
lawfully residing in a dwelling have no duty to retreat before re-
sorting to deadly force necessary for self-defense. [Florida’s Stand 
Your Ground Law gives] invited guests in another person’s “castle” 
. . . the same rights to self-defense as a resident of the expanded 
castle.191 
                                                                                                                      
to “retreat within the residence to the extent reasonably possible, but not from the resi-
dence, before resorting to deadly force against a co-occupant or invitee necessary to prevent 
death or great bodily harm.” Id. at 4.   
 185. Id. at 5.  
 186. Id.  
 187. Id. at 6 (“Legal presumptions are typically rebuttable. The presumptions created 
by the committee substitute, however, appear to be conclusive.”); see also id. (stating that 
Florida’s stand your ground law “does not require proof that the intruder was attempting 
to engage in a forcible felony[, as] the intruder’s actual intent is irrelevant”). 
 188. Id. at 5. Florida’s stand your ground law “prevent[s] a jury from determining 
whether a person had a reasonable fear,” but likely permits juries to decide “whether an 
entry was unlawful and forcible, and whether the defender knew or had reason to know 
that the entry was unlawful and forcible.” Id. at 6.  
 189. Id. at 5 (adding “unless there is a domestic violence injunction or written pretrial 
supervision order of no contact against that person”).  
 190. Id. However, the presumptions will not benefit the defender “if the defender was 
engaged in unlawful activity at the time of the unlawful and forcible entry or if the de-
fender was using his or her home, place of temporary lodging, place of temporary lodging of 
another, or vehicle to further unlawful activity.” Id. Additionally, the “unlawful activity” 
and the “unlawful forcible entry” do not have to be related to defeat the presumption. Id. 
 191. Id. at 6.  
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Further, the law abrogates the common law duty to retreat where 
the defender is in a place where he or she is lawfully entitled to be.192 
However, even under the new law, a person who defends himself or 
herself outside of his or her “expanded castle” must reasonably be-
lieve deadly force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great 
bodily harm.193  
 Reactions to the changes discussed above vary from supporters 
touting the new law as a “reasonable, self-protection bill [that] de-
fends innocent life,”194 to those in opposition observing that the law 
“will encourage a ‘Wild West’ atmosphere in Florida, where people 
are emboldened to use deadly force without fear of prosecution.”195 
Only time will tell which, if either, side is correct.196 
HEALTH CARE LAW—TREATMENT—PRIVACY RIGHTS—DUE PROCESS—
WITHDRAWAL OF LIFE SUPPORT—THE THERESA SCHIAVO DECISIONS 
 Even compared to the most controversial legal issues of the past 
several years, the jurisprudence regarding Theresa Schiavo (herein-
after collectively referred to as the “Terri Schiavo case”) distin-
guishes itself as particularly polarizing. With the utmost sincerity, 
very intelligent people—even foremost experts in law and medi-
                                                                                                                      
 192. Id. The Staff Analysis further explained: 
Under Florida common law, a person has a duty to retreat, if outside his or her 
home or place of business before resorting to deadly force reasonably believed 
necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm. A person attacked 
within his or her home by a co-occupant or invitee must also retreat, if possible, 
within the home, but not from the home, before resorting to deadly force. Un-
der [Florida’s stand your ground law], a person will no longer have any duty to 
retreat, unless the person is not in a place where he or she is lawfully entitled 
to be. 
Id. 
 193. Id. at 5.   
 194. Kelley Beaucar Vlahos, Floridians’ Self-Defense Rights Expanded, FOXNEWS.COM, 
May 3, 2005, available at http://www.foxnews.com/printer_friendly_story/ 
0,3566,155303,00.html (quoting Florida State Representative Dennis Baxley).  
 195. Id. (quoting Florida State Senator Steven Geller as saying “I hate this bill and I 
voted for it . . . . Here’s the problem—the first two parts of the bill are mom and apple pie 
and American flags and Chevrolet, so you can’t vote against it . . . the third part is terri-
ble”). As indicated by the quote from Senator Geller, much of the controversy with the new 
law stems from the “third part” of the bill’s abrogation of the duty to retreat before using 
deadly force where the defender is in a place he or she is lawfully entitled to be. Many crit-
ics of the new law fear that doing away with the duty to retreat will result in situations 
such as “men, liquored-up at a sporting event [getting] into a deadly confrontation and 
then claim[ing] self-defense.” Id. (referencing a comment by Senator Geller).  
 196. Perhaps neither side’s view of the changes that the new law will bring is correct. 
See Shannon Colavecchio-Van Sickler, Will Deadly Force Law Open Door to Abuses?, ST. 
PETE. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2005, at 1A (quoting Florida State University criminology professor 
Gary Kleck, “I don’t think criminals really have any idea about the intricacies of the law on 
self-defense . . . . And the same folks who weren’t likely to retreat before, will continue to 
not retreat”).  
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cine197—decisively disagree as to whether the flurry of published 
court holdings (in excess of fifty) were decided “correctly.”198  Popular 
opinion seems to range from calling the actions of the Florida court 
system “judicial murder,” to calling the seeming endless parade of 
judicial appeals and impromptu legislation, at both the state and 
federal levels, religious-political conservatism run amok, with com-
paratively few opinions falling moderately between.199 Independent of 
public perception of the propriety of events, however, the law, both 
judicial and statutory, has changed dramatically since the well-
known, tragic events of February 25, 1990, when Schiavo abruptly 
lost consciousness due to a potassium imbalance caused by overag-
gressive dieting behavior.200 What follows below is a summary of the 
law that was applied in the many decisions regarding the Terri 
Schiavo case; how that law interacted with the peculiar facts of this 
case; how that law interacted with the subsequent and arguably un-
precedented actions of the Florida Legislature and the United States 
Congress; how the statutory law has been changed subsequent to, 
and independent of, the onset of this case; and finally, what the deci-
sions of the Terri Schiavo case did not decide. Many important legal 
issues, from obscure rules of Florida civil procedure to the separation 
of powers under the United States Constitution, were affected, dis-
cussed, and often held to be dispositive. However, this Note will focus 
on issues relating to Florida and federal due process and privacy 
rights as they relate to end-of-life decisionmaking, the Florida Con-
stitution’s requirement of separation of powers as it relates to the 
statute popularly referred to as “Terri’s law,”201 and federal subject 
matter jurisdiction as it relates to Public Law 109-3, entitled “An Act 
For the Relief of the Parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo.”202 Due to the 
unusual volume and nature of the events relevant to the Terri 
Schiavo case, this Note will begin with a chronology.   
A.   Chronology of Events Relevant to the Terri Schiavo Case 
 February 25, 1990—After six years of marriage, Terri Schiavo, 27, 
suffered cardiac arrest and lost consciousness due to a potassium im-
balance caused by an overaggressive diet.203  
                                                                                                                      
 197. See, e.g., John Leo, The End of Argument, USNEWS.COM, Apr. 25, 2005, 
http://www.usnews.com/usnews/opinion/articles/050425/25john.htm.  
 198. A list of the most significant opinions can be found at In re Guardianship of 
Schiavo, 916 So. 2d 814, 814 n.1 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005).  
 199. See, e.g., Leo, supra note 197. 
 200. In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 916 So. 2d at 815 n.2. 
 201. See Act effective Oct. 21, 2003, ch. 2003-418, 2004 Fla. Laws 1.  
 202. 119 Stat. 15 (2005). 
 203. In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 916 So. 2d at 815 n.2. 
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 From 1990 to 2005—“Theresa . . . lived in nursing homes with 
constant care. She [was] fed and hydrated by tubes. The staff 
change[d] her diapers regularly. She . . . had numerous health prob-
lems, but none [were] life threatening.”204 
 1992—As a result of a settlement agreement and a jury award, 
Michael Schiavo (Terri’s husband) received a significant sum of 
money from a medical malpractice suit, charging that doctors failed 
to diagnose an eating disorder, which likely caused the events of Feb-
ruary 25.205 The award, while sufficient to care for Terri for several 
years,206 was likely inadequate to cover long-term caregiving ex-
penses.  
 1993—Michael Schiavo and Robert and Mary Schindler (Terri’s 
parents), who “enjoyed an amicable relationship”207 for the first three 
years subsequent to the tragedy, had an argument purportedly con-
cerning the expenditure of the malpractice-recovery money, which 
resulted in cessation of communication.208  
 Mid 1996—CAT scans reflected nearly all of Schiavo’s cerebral 
cortex (the portion of the brain used for cognitive processes) had been 
replaced by cerebral spinal fluid.209 According to the court, “medicine 
cannot cure this condition. Unless an act of God, a true miracle, were 
to recreate her brain, Theresa [would] always remain in an uncon-
scious, reflexive state, totally dependent upon others to feed her and 
care for her most private needs.”210 
 May 1998—Apparently due to a dispute between her husband and 
parents concerning pecuniary motives, Michael Schiavo, acting in his 
capacity as his wife’s legal guardian, asked the court to determine 
whether Terri Schiavo would want to discontinue life-prolonging 
treatment, if she were then presently competent to make that deci-
sion.211 The court noted that there was “no evidence” that either Terri 
Schiavo’s husband or parents had financial motives in holding their 
respective positions.212 
 February 2000—In the original guardianship case, Michael 
Schiavo petitioned the guardianship court, pursuant to the 1997 ver-
sion of chapter 765, Florida Statutes, to decide two questions.213 First, 
                                                                                                                      
 204. In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 780 So. 2d 176, 177 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (finding 
that there was clear and convincing evidence that Schiavo would want the withdrawal of 
life-support measures). 
 205. Id. at 178. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Bush v. Schiavo, 885 So. 2d 321, 325 (Fla. 2004). 
 208. In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 780 So. 2d at 179. 
 209. Id. at 177. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. at 178. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. 
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was his wife and ward, Terri Schiavo, in a persistent vegetative 
state, and if so, would she want to discontinue life-prolonging proce-
dures that kept her alive while in that state?214 The guardianship 
court determined that there was overwhelmingly conclusive evidence 
that Schiavo was in a persistent vegetative state and that there was 
clear and convincing evidence that Schiavo would want to discon-
tinue life-prolonging procedures that were keeping her alive,215 allow-
ing “her family members and loved ones to be free to continue their 
lives.”216 As a result of these findings, the guardianship court ordered 
the removal of all life-sustaining equipment.217  
 January 2001—The case was appealed to the Second District 
Court of Appeal, where the court was asked to resolve a number of 
issues, the most pertinent of which was whether there was sufficient 
evidence for the guardianship court judge to decide that there was 
clear and convincing evidence that Schiavo would want to discon-
tinue life-prolonging procedures when the evidence considered was in 
the form of contradicted testimony.218 While the appellate court noted 
there was contradictory testimonial evidence (though the guardian-
ship judge was free to assess which of the testimonial evidence was 
more credible), and that when in doubt the guardianship court was to 
“err on the side of life,” the appellate court nevertheless held there 
was sufficient evidence from which the guardianship judge could 
base his decision.219 The Florida Supreme Court declined review of 
the case.220  
 October 2003 to October 2004—After two failed motions for relief, 
an ordered rehearing in the guardianship court that redetermined 
Schiavo was really in a persistent vegetative state, which was af-
firmed on direct appeal,221 and a variety of other several other failed 
motions filed in both state and federal courts, the Florida Legislature 
intervened with the passage of Terri’s law.222 As a part of the en-
forcement of that law, while its constitutionality was being argued by 
both parties, a third independent guardian was appointed at the re-
                                                                                                                      
 214. Id. at 178-79. 
 215. See id. at 177 (noting “[t]he trial court made a difficult decision after considering 
all of the evidence and the applicable law” and concluding “that the trial court’s decision is 
supported by competent, substantial evidence and that it correctly applies the law”).  
 216. Id. at 180. 
 217. See id. at 177 (noting that the trial court’s order authorized the discontinuance of 
artificial life support).  
 218. Id. at 179.  
 219. Id. at 179-80. 
 220. Schindler v. Schiavo ex rel. Schiavo, 789 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 2001) (unpublished table 
decision). 
 221. In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 851 So. 2d 182, 183 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). 
 222. Act effective Oct. 21, 2003, ch. 2003-418, 2004 Fla. Laws 1. 
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quest of Governor Bush.223 The guardian later determined there was 
no reasonable medical hope that Schiavo would improve.224 Ulti-
mately, the Florida Supreme Court struck down the statute as un-
constitutional, both on its face and as applied to Schiavo.225  
 March 2005—After several more failed motions, the United States 
Congress intervened with the passage of Public Law Number 109-
3.226 Accepting the jurisdiction given to the federal courts through 
Public Law 109-3 with extreme reluctance,227 the district court de-
termined that there were not sufficient grounds to grant a temporary 
restraining order against the removal of Schiavo’s life-prolonging 
equipment.228 The district court’s determination was upheld on direct 
appeal.229 
 March 31, 2005—Subsequent to a denial of certiorari by the U.S. 
Supreme230 and several other failed motions in both the state and 
federal courts, more than five years after the initial order requiring 
the removal of Schiavo from life-prolonging treatment, Schiavo 
died.231 
B.   An Incapacitated Individual’s Right to Refuse Life Support: A 
Summary and Analysis of In re Guardianship of Schiavo (Schiavo I), 
780 So. 2d 176 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) 
 The statutory and common law guidance used in the guardianship 
court’s order of February 11, 2000—requiring that Schiavo be re-
moved from life-support mechanisms—changed considerably during 
the five-year course of litigation.232 The applicable statute, guided by 
constitutional considerations discussed in dicta from In re Guardian-
ship of Browning,233 allows for a surrogate (Michael Schiavo, in this 
case) to ask the court to decide whether the ward, if presently compe-
                                                                                                                      
 223. In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 30 Fla. L. Weekly D743, D744 (Fla. 2d DCA Mar. 
16, 2005). 
 224. Id.  
 225. Bush v. Schiavo, 885 So. 2d 321, 324 (Fla. 2004). 
 226. 119 Stat. 15 (2005). 
 227. Dicta from the Eleventh Circuit strongly suggests that the law giving the federal 
courts jurisdiction was unconstitutional, and that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which 
prohibits the federal courts from reexamining the final judgments of state courts under 
certain relevant circumstances, required the federal courts to refuse jurisdiction. See gen-
erally Schiavo v. Schiavo, 404 F.3d 1270, 1272-79 (11th Cir. 2005) (Birch, J., concurring). 
But see id. at 1279-82 (Tjoflat, J., dissenting). 
 228. Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1223, 1225 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 229. Id. at 1226. 
 230. Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 125 S. Ct. 1692 (2005). 
 231. Carl Hulse & David D. Kirkpatrick, The Schiavo Case: Political Strategy; Even 
Death Does Not Quiet Harsh Political Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2005, at A1, available at 
2005 WL 5085920.  
 232. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 780 So. 2d 176, 178 n.2 (Fla. 2d DCA 
2001). 
 233. 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990). 
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tent to decide for herself, would decide to refuse continued use of life 
support.234 The statute also provides a mechanism for an interested 
person to challenge the decision of a surrogate in his decision to 
withhold or continue life support for the ward.235 Michael Schiavo 
availed himself of the first legal possibility.236 At that time, the court 
was required to determine what Schiavo herself would have wanted 
to be done, had she herself been competent to make that determina-
tion.237 
 This determination was to be made utilizing a standard of proof 
requiring clear and convincing evidence.238 The applicable standard 
of review required the appellate court to find that the guardianship 
court based its decision on competent, substantial evidence.239 
 The court noted that the evidence regarding Schiavo’s wishes was 
testimonial and was contradicted by other testimony.240 Nevertheless, 
presumably because judges are permitted to comparatively weigh the 
credibility of witnesses,241 the court determined that “[t]he clear and 
convincing standard of proof, while very high, permits a decision in 
the face of inconsistent or conflicting evidence.”242 Similarly, while 
the court required any ambiguity as to the projected desires of the 
patient to be determined in favor of assuming a desire to live, the 
court found that the level of evidence in the case was such that there 
was no ambiguity.243 The court concluded: 
                                                                                                                      
 234. In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 780 So. 2d at 179.  
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. at 178. It is worth noting that today, however, the court would instead make a 
determination as to what would be in the “best interests” of the ward. Id. at 178 n.2 (citing 
FLA. STAT. § 765.404 (2005). The statute itself creates an elaborate procedure for a guard-
ian assessing the best interests of the patient and does not discuss what to do when the 
guardian is unable to reach a decision or his decision is subsequently challenged by an in-
terested party. In these instances, In re Guardianship of Browning applies. There is, of 
course, no way of knowing whether this different frame of question would lead to a differ-
ent result. 
 238. Id. at 179. 
 239. Id. at 177. 
 240. Id. at 179. 
 241. Id. In Judge Greer’s decision of February 11, 2000, he explicitly delineated all the 
testimony suggesting Schiavo would have desired to continue life-prolonging treatment, 
and item by item, explained why each piece of testimony was irrelevant to determining 
Schiavo’s desires. In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 2000 WL 34546718 passim (Fla. Cir. Ct. 
Feb. 11, 2000). Specifically, the judge determined that the impromptu objections made by 
Schiavo as a child while watching a movie about an incapacitated person taken off life 
support were only enlightening in that they suggested how Schiavo felt as a child about 
other people utilizing life support. Id. at *6. Meanwhile, statements to her husband and 
her friend regarding her own desires as an adult, specifically statements regarding her de-
sire not to be a burden, were revealing about what she would want presently. Id. 
 242. In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 780 So. 2d at 179. 
 243. Id. at 179-80. 
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The testimony in this case establishes that Theresa was very 
young and very healthy when this tragedy struck. Like many 
young people without children, she had not prepared a will, much 
less a living will. She had been raised in the Catholic faith, but did 
not regularly attend mass or have a religious advisor who could 
assist the court in weighing her religious attitudes about life-
support methods. Her statements to her friends and family about 
the dying process were few and they were oral. Nevertheless, those 
statements, along with other evidence about Theresa, gave the 
trial court a sufficient basis to make this decision for her. 
 In the final analysis, the difficult question that faced the trial 
court was whether Theresa Marie Schindler Schiavo, not after a 
few weeks in a coma, but after ten years in a persistent vegetative 
state that has robbed her of most of her cerebrum and all but the 
most instinctive of neurological functions, with no hope of a medi-
cal cure but with sufficient money and strength of body to live in-
definitely, would choose to continue the constant nursing care and 
the supporting tubes in hopes that a miracle would somehow rec-
reate her missing brain tissue, or whether she would wish to per-
mit a natural death process to take its course and for her family 
members and loved ones to be free to continue their lives. After 
due consideration, we conclude that the trial judge had clear and 
convincing evidence to answer this question as he did.244 
 Naturally, for any analysis of Schiavo’s projected desires to be 
relevant, an initial decision had to be made regarding her being in a 
persistent vegetative state. The court described Schiavo’s condition 
as follows: “She is not asleep. She has cycles of apparent wakefulness 
and apparent sleep without any cognition or awareness. As she 
breathes, she often makes moaning sounds. Theresa has severe con-
tractures of her hands, elbows, knees, and feet.”245 Regarding any 
chance of recovery, the court opined that “[m]edicine cannot cure this 
condition. Unless an act of God, a true miracle, were to recreate her 
brain, Theresa will always remain in an unconscious, reflexive state, 
totally dependent upon others to feed her and care for her most pri-
vate needs.”246 The court concluded that “[t]he evidence is overwhelm-
ing that Theresa is in a permanent or persistent vegetative state.”247  
 There were two other issues the Schindlers brought to the court’s 
attention. First, they contended that the court needed to appoint a 
guardian ad litem to replace Michael Schiavo, as he stood to inherit a 
large some of money upon Schiavo’s death.248 After noting that the 
guardians contemplated by section 765.404, Florida Statutes, would 
very often be the relatives of the ward and therefore likely to inherit 
                                                                                                                      
 244. Id.  
 245. Id. at 177. 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id.  
 248. Id. at 178. 
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money, the court discussed that Michael Schiavo was not the one re-
sponsible for the decision but instead that the court was, and that 
therefore any potential bias in the guardian was irrelevant.249 Inde-
pendent of this analysis, the court also expressed its strong belief 
that the motives of both parties, while either stood to gain monetar-
ily depending upon a particular resolution of events, were entirely 
pure and devoid of pecuniary desires.250 The second issue involved 
the permissibility of hearing evidence from an expert on attitudes 
toward discontinuation of life support.251 While the court suggested 
that such evidence might be inappropriate in making a “best inter-
ests” assessment (which would suggest that similar expert testimony 
would be inadmissible today, since the relevant statute now requires 
a best interests assessment), the court found the judge did not give it 
“undue” weight in this case.252 
 In summary, the court affirmed that there was clear and convinc-
ing evidence that Schiavo was in a persistent vegetative state and 
that she would elect to discontinue life support if she were competent 
to do so. 
C.   Schiavo I Vested Terri Schiavo with a Privacy Right to 
Discontinue Life Support 
 Both competent and incompetent people have the right to refuse 
or discontinue life-prolonging procedures.253 Incompetent people 
maintain this right even if they lacked the foresight or means to pre-
pare a living will or any other authoritative writing prior to their in-
capacitation.254 Once a court has made the decision that the ward 
would have desired to discontinue life-prolonging procedures, a pri-
vacy right vests in the ward to have those life-prolonging procedures 
discontinued.255  
                                                                                                                      
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. (“[W]e see no evidence in this record that either Michael or the Schindlers seek 
monetary gain from their actions. Michael and the Schindlers simply cannot agree on what 
decision Theresa would make today if she were able to assess her own condition and make 
her own decision.”). 
 251. Id. at 179.  
 252. Id. 
 253. In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 916 So. 2d 814, 815 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (citing 
John F. Kennedy Mem’l Hosp., Inc. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1984) (relying on the 
explicit privacy right given by article I, section 23 of the Florida Constitution, which gives 
more protection than the implied privacy right given by the United States Constitution).  
 254. Id. at 815-16 (citing Corbett v. D’Alessandro, 487 So. 2d 368 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986), 
and In re Guardianship of Barry, 445 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984)). 
 255. Id. at 815 (“Mrs. Schiavo’s legal guardian [does not have] the option of leaving the 
life-prolonging procedures in place. No matter who her guardian is, the guardian is re-
quired to obey the court order because the court, and not the guardian, has determined the 
decision that Mrs. Schiavo herself would make.”).  
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 When asked to rule on the validity of the original decision, the 
Second District Court of Appeal enunciated its belief that “[n]ot only 
has Mrs. Schiavo’s case been given due process, but few, if any, simi-
lar cases have ever been afforded this heightened level of process.”256 
To support this unusual declaration, the court cited the numerous 
formal proceedings, many rendered out of judicial sympathy for the 
Schindlers even when the proceedings were legally inappropriate.257 
While noting the court’s extreme sympathy for the Schindlers,258 
“that many people around the world disagree with the trial court’s 
decision,”259 and that the images of Schiavo’s face were “haunting,”260 
the court, utilizing past precedent regarding Florida privacy rights, 
framed the main issue as Schiavo’s constitutional right to discon-
tinue her life support.261 Several years prior the guardianship court 
had, by clear and convincing evidence, determined that Schiavo 
would want to discontinue life-prolonging procedures, and it was now 
the job of the court to ensure that Schiavo’s decision, as determined 
through the court system, be honored.262 
D.   Although Terri’s Law Was Potentially a Violation of Schiavo’s 
Florida Privacy Rights, the Florida Supreme Court Instead Declared 
the Law Unconstitutional as a Violation of the Florida Constitution’s 
Requirement of Separation of Powers 
 At the onset, the Florida Supreme Court made clear that its role 
was limited to determining the constitutionality of Terri’s law and 
did not include a reexamination of lower court decisions relating to 
the withdrawal of Schiavo from life support.263 With the issue thus 
framed, the Florida Supreme Court found that Terri’s law264 “violates 
                                                                                                                      
 256. Id.  
 257. Id. at 817-18 (“Because of the nature of this case, neither the trial court nor this 
court has enforced these general rules [barring many of the Schindler’s ultimately failed 
motions from consideration].”). 
 258. Id. at 818. 
 259. Id.  
 260. Id.  
 261. Id. (“But in the end, this case is not about the aspirations that loving parents have 
for their children. It is about Theresa Schiavo’s right to make her own decision, independ-
ent of her parents and independent of her husband.”) (quoting In re Guardianship of 
Schiavo, 851 So. 2d 182, 186-87 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)). 
 262. Id.  
 263. Bush v. Schiavo, 885 So. 2d 321, 324 (Fla. 2004). The court nevertheless immedi-
ately followed this admonishment with a very thorough discussion of the proceedings to 
date and quoted frequently from the records of many of the various, related proceedings. 
Id. at 324-28. 
 264. Terri’s law states in full: 
  Section 1. (1) The Governor shall have the authority to issue a one-time stay 
to prevent the withholding of nutrition and hydration from a patient if, as of 
October 15, 2003: 
(a) That patient has no written advance directive; 
(b) The court has found that patient to be in a persistent vegetative state;  
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the fundamental constitutional tenet of separation of powers and is 
therefore unconstitutional both on its face and as applied to Theresa 
Schiavo.”265 Specifically, the court held that the statute was unconsti-
tutional as applied to Schiavo because it violated article II, section 3 
of the Florida Constitution, which prohibits one branch of govern-
ment from exercising the powers of another branch,266 and that the 
statute was unconstitutional on its face because the same constitu-
tional provision prohibits the legislature from delegating any of its 
powers in such a way as to give the executive unfettered discretion in 
exercising the delegation.267 
E.   Terri’s Law Was Unconstitutional as Applied Because It 
Impermissibly Reallocated Judicial Power to the Executive 
 “[T]he judiciary is a coequal branch of the Florida government 
vested with the sole authority to exercise the judicial power, and the 
legislature cannot . . . reallocate the balance of power . . . among the 
three coequal branches.”268 Judicial power is not limited to ruling on a 
particular case, but to decide them with finality, reviewable only by 
                                                                                                                      
(c) That patient has had nutrition and hydration withheld; and 
(d) A member of that patient’s family has challenged the withholding of nutri-
tion and hydration. 
  (2) The Governor’s authority to issue the stay expires 15 days after the effec-
tive date of this act, and the expiration of that authority does not impact the 
validity or the effect of any stay issued pursuant to this act. The Governor may 
lift the stay authorized under this act at any time. A person may not be held 
civilly liable and is not subject to regulatory or disciplinary sanctions for taking 
any action to comply with a stay issued by the Governor pursuant to this act. 
  (3) Upon the issuance of a stay, the chief judge of the circuit court shall ap-
point a guardian ad litem for the patient to make recommendations to the Gov-
ernor and the Court. 
  Section 2. This act shall take effect upon becoming law. 
Act effective Oct. 21, 2003, ch. 2003-418, 2004 Fla. Laws 1. 
 265. Bush, 885 So. 2d at 324. The circuit court found that Terri’s law was facially un-
constitutional as an unlawful delegation of legislative authority, as a violation of privacy 
rights, and as applied because it permitted “the Governor to encroach upon the judicial 
power and to retroactively abolish Theresa’s vested right to privacy.” Id. at 328. Because 
the Florida Supreme Court found the separation of powers issue to be dispositive, however, 
the court only held Terri’s law to be unconstitutional on that issue. Id. at 328 n.2. 
 266. Article II, section 3 of the Florida Constitution reads in pertinent part: “The pow-
ers of the state government shall be divided into legislative, executive and judicial 
branches. No person belonging to one branch shall exercise any powers appertaining to ei-
ther of the other branches unless expressly provided herein.” FLA. CONST., art. II, § 3. 
 267. Bush, 885 So. 2d at 332.  “The Legislature ‘may not delegate the power to enact a 
law or the right to exercise unrestricted discretion in applying the law.’ ” Id. (quoting Sims 
v. Florida, 754 So. 2d 657, 668 (Fla. 2000)).  
 268. Id. at 330 (quoting Chiles v. Children A, B, C, D, E, & F, 589 So. 2d 260, 268-69 
(Fla. 1991)).  
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higher courts within the judiciary,269 and “purely judicial acts . . . are 
not subject to review as to their accuracy by the Governor.”270 
 After articulating the law as set forth above, the court summa-
rized the procession of judicial proceedings before emphatically char-
acterizing the decision of the guardianship court of February 11, 
2000, to be “final.”271 The court rejected arguments from the Governor 
and amici that the guardianship court’s decision was not final as it 
was subject to revocation until the death of the ward because Florida 
Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b), which permits the potentiality of 
revocation, also explicitly declares that its potential revocation does 
not affect the judgment’s otherwise “final” disposition.272  
 Because the legislature had previously established the judicial 
mechanism to be used in determining the exercise of an incompe-
tent’s right to refuse life support and because the judicial system 
fully complied with and concluded the course of that established 
mechanism, the judiciary alone had the power to determine Schiavo’s 
decision to terminate life support.273 The legislature, even though it 
had created the mechanism used by the judiciary, was not free to 
change the mechanism after the judiciary had rendered a final deci-
sion utilizing the legislature’s predetermined method.274 In other 
words, after the court had rendered its decision pursuant to then ex-
isting judicial and statutory guidance, the legislature cannot then 
pass a law allowing “the executive branch to interfere with the final 
judicial determination of a case.”275 
 In summary, it appears that whenever a court has made a final 
decision on a particular case, utilizing a properly proscribed process, 
the legislature cannot change that process with the effect of upset-
ting a particular case’s finality. As a result, Terri’s law was facially 
unconstitutional because it impermissibly delegated unfettered dis-
cretion to the executive in exercising legislative power.  
 After concluding that the law was unconstitutional as applied to 
Schiavo, the court continued its analysis by also finding the act un-
constitutional on its face.276 Although the legislature may “transfer 
                                                                                                                      
 269. Id. (citing Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1447 (1995)). 
 270. Id. (quoting In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 213 So. 2d 716, 720 (Fla. 
1968) (alteration in original)).  
 271. Id. at 331. 
 272. Id. (stating that even if “a final judgment may be subject to recall under a rule of 
procedure . . . [that] does not negate its finality”). 
 273. Id. 
 274. Id. at 332. 
 275. Id. “[I]t is without question an invasion of the authority of the judicial branch for 
the Legislature to pass a law that allows the executive branch to interfere with the final 
judicial determination in a case. That is precisely what occurred here and for that reason 
the Act is unconstitutional . . . .” Id.  
 276. Id. 
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subordinate functions ‘to permit administration of legislative policy 
by an agency,’ ”277 it “ ‘may not delegate the power to enact a law or 
the right to exercise unrestricted discretion in applying the law.’ ”278 
That is the essence of Florida’s nondelegation doctrine.279 Fundamen-
tal policy choices must be made by the legislature, and the execu-
tive’s administration of legislative programs must be objectively and 
tangibly guided by standards within the enactment of the program.280 
Those standards “must so clearly define the power delegated that the 
[executive] is precluded from acting through whim, showing favorit-
ism, or exercising unbridled discretion.”281 One reason the court de-
mands such standards is to allow for “meaningful judicial review.”282 
 The specificity required from the standards enunciated in the en-
actment depends on its subject matter.283 Relevant factors include the 
complexity of the enactment’s subject matter and the difficulty in-
volved in fully delineating objective standards.284 Even when dealing 
with the most complex subject matter, however, where pragmatics 
dictate having very relaxed standards, the court requires that the 
terms of the enactment cannot be “so general and unrestrictive that 
administrators are left without standards for the guidance of their of-
ficial acts.”285 
 After explaining the above applicable law, the court examined two 
examples of statutes that it had declared unconstitutional in the past 
due to their vague standards.286 Although both the statutes had sub-
jective standards—such as requiring that an area be “significantly 
affected by . . . an existing or proposed major public facility” as a part 
of permitting the Division of State Planning to declare that area one 
of critical state concern287—the court found them to be too vague be-
cause they “did not contain sufficient standards to allow a reviewing 
court to ascertain whether the priorities recognized by the [executive] 
comport with the intent of the legislature.”288 In other words, the act 
did not explain what threshold the legislature had in mind for differ-
entiating merely affected from “significantly affected,” or public facil-
                                                                                                                      
 277. Id. (quoting Microtel, Inc. v. Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 464 So. 2d 1189, 1191 (Fla. 
1985)).  
 278. Id. (interpreting article II, section 3 of the Florida Constitution and quoting Sims 
v. Florida, 754 So. 2d 657, 668 (Fla. 2000)).  
 279. Id. 
 280. Id. 
 281. Id. (quoting Lewis v. Bank of Pasco County, 346 So. 2d 53, 55-56 (Fla. 1976)). 
 282. Id. 
 283. Id. at 332-33. 
 284. Id. at 333. 
 285. Id. (quoting Fla. Dep’t of Citrus v. Griffin, 239 So. 2d 577, 581 (Fla. 1970)). 
 286. Id. at 333-34. 
 287. Id. at 333 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 380.05(2)(b) (1975)).  
 288. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
368  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:331 
 
ity from “major public facility.”289 The court determined that the 
overall net effect of such vagueness was to attempt to grant to  the 
executive “the power to say what the law shall be.”290 
 The court then compared those statutes with Terri’s law, which 
“contains no guidelines or standards that would serve to limit the 
Governor from exercising completely unrestricted discretion in apply-
ing the law.”291 As examples of the unfettered discretion the law ten-
dered the Governor, the court discussed the lack of any guidance 
given on whether the Governor should issue a stay of withdrawal of 
life support, how long the stay should last, and under what circum-
stances the stay should be lifted.292  
 The court rejected the idea that the unique specificity of the law, 
including it only being applicable for fifteen days and having applica-
tion to one person, constituted a sufficient objective limitation. The 
duration and specificity of the law were irrelevant toward guiding 
the Governor’s power where permitted by the law.293 The court also 
rejected the Governor’s argument that the legislation merely created 
an extra layer of due process, because while the rest of chapter 765, 
Florida Statutes, required the determination of the incapacitated in-
dividual’s desires as to withdrawal of life support, Terri’s law did not 
provide for the Governor to take those desires into account.294 Since 
the due process afforded by chapter 765, Florida Statutes, was 
clearly targeted at reviewing the potential desires of the incapaci-
tated individual and Terri’s law did not expressly require such a re-
view, the court determined that it was essentially an act to upset the 
finality of a result of due process with which the legislature and the 
Governor disagreed.295 Finally, the court tersely rejected the Gover-
nor’s argument that Terri’s law was just a valid expression of the 
State’s police power—“[a]lthough unquestionably the Legislature 
may enact laws to protect those citizens who are incapable of protect-
ing their own interests such laws must comply with the constitution. 
Chapter 2003-418 fails to do so.”296 The court further pointedly criti-
cized the argument by saying that the law did not even aim to pro-
tect people incapable of protecting their own interests but was so 
                                                                                                                      
 289. See id. 
 290. Id. at 334 (quoting Lewis v. Bank of Pasco County, 346 So. 2d 53, 56 (Fla. 1976)). 
 291. Id. (quoting with approval the decision of the circuit court which had declared 
Terri’s law unconstitutional, for violation of the nondelegation doctrine, among other rea-
sons).  
 292. Id. 
 293. Id. at 334. 
 294. Id. at 336. 
 295. See id. 
 296. Id. (citations omitted). 
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specific that it only protected one person—Schiavo—to the exclusion 
of all others similarly situated.297  
 Although the court chose to nullify Terri’s law as a violation of 
separation of powers and the nondelegation doctrine, the lower court 
had declared the law unconstitutional, in addition to other reasons, 
as a violation of Schiavo’s right to privacy.298 The grandly rhetorical 
nature of the court’s conclusion, however, seems to strongly suggest 
that the court believes the law implicated many related privacy right 
concerns. For example, according to the court:  
 The continuing vitality of our system of separation of powers 
precludes the other two branches from nullifying the judicial 
branch’s final orders. If the Legislature with the assent of the Gov-
ernor can do what was attempted here, the judicial branch would 
be subordinated to the final directive of the other branches. Also 
subordinated would be the rights of individuals, including the well 
established privacy right to self determination. No court judgment 
could ever be considered truly final and no constitutional right 
truly secure, because the precedent of this case would hold to the 
contrary. Vested rights could be stripped away based on popular 
clamor.299 
In essence, the court had perceived the previous five years of near 
continuous, contentious litigation as having concluded with a final 
decision as to the desires of how Schiavo would want to exercise her 
right to discontinue life-prolonging procedures. Terri’s law, though 
surely drafted with the most sincere intentions, appeared to be a di-
rect attack on Schiavo’s fully adjudicated vested right of privacy. 
Simply put, the legislature and the Governor cannot do that.  
F.   Other Legislative and Judicial Proceedings 
 A few days after the Florida Supreme Court declared Terri’s law 
unconstitutional, the United States Congress passed Public Law 109-
3, entitled “An Act for the Relief of the Parents of Theresa Maria 
Schiavo.”300 Almost immediately the federal courts balked at the Act’s 
questionable constitutionality, although neither the trial court nor 
the federal court explicitly declared it unconstitutional. Instead, util-
izing the discretion permitted by the Act, the trial court declined to 
issue a temporary restraining order preventing Schiavo’s continued 
withdrawal from life support,301 thereby eventually mooting the other 
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 300. Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 357 F. Supp. 2d 1378, 1382 (M.D. Fla. 2005). 
 301. Id. at 1382-83. Nevertheless, a later sharp concurring opinion by Judge Birch of 
the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals detailed the argument for the Act’s unconstitutional-
ity and subsequently urged the federal court system to decline all jurisdiction over the case 
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issues by reason of Schiavo’s death. The Middle District of Florida, 
upheld on direct appeal to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, de-
nied a temporary injunction on behalf of the Schindlers because the 
court determined that the Schindlers had very little chance of win-
ning their case upon the merits.302 Even after discussing the potenti-
ality of irreparable injury to be suffered by Schiavo, the threat of the 
injury outweighing the harm to be inflicted by the temporary injunc-
tion, and the potential public utility of the issuance of the temporary 
injunction—which are three of the four factors examined when a 
court is asked to issue an injunction—the court upheld the propriety 
in refusing the injunction due to the minimal likelihood of the 
Schindlers eventually winning on the merits.303  
 After the Schindlers’ failure to obtain federal review through the 
aid of Public Law 109-3, they alleged nine different and independent 
claims in an attempt to otherwise obtain federal review.304 Again, af-
ter a lengthy and detailed analysis of each claim, where the claims 
ranged from a violation of Schiavo’s rights under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act305 to a breach of procedural due process,306 the court 
flatly refused to reverse the trial court’s decision not to enter an in-
junction.307  
 After a final failed flurry of appeals, on March 31, 2005, Schiavo 
died, quite publicly, pursuant to her adjudicated right of privacy to 
withdraw herself from life support.308  
G.   Conclusion 
 After a lengthy trial, a guardianship court determined by clear 
and convincing evidence that Schiavo was in a persistent vegetative 
state and that she would invoke her privacy right to discontinue life 
support if she were competent to make that decision. In furtherance 
of Schiavo’s judicially determined wishes and pursuant to applicable 
statutory and constitutional law, the court ordered her withdrawal 
from life support. After the guardianship court’s determination was 
reviewed and reaffirmed in an unprecedented number of judicial pro-
ceedings, the Florida legislature passed a law aimed at preventing 
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the enforcement of the judicial order rendered pursuant to the court’s 
determinations, and the Supreme Court of Florida, perceiving the 
law as a direct threat to Schiavo’s adjudicated privacy rights, nulli-
fied the law as violating the Florida Constitution’s separation of 
powers. Soon after that nullification, the United States Congress 
passed a law permitting federal review of the guardianship court’s 
determination. Suspicious of that law’s constitutionality and because 
of the very small likelihood of success on the merits, the federal court 
refused to order a temporary injunction that would have reconnected 
Schiavo to life support, while the court offered federal review of the 
merits of the Schindlers’ claims. As a result, before the Schindlers’ 
claims could be reviewed by the federal judiciary, they were mooted 
by the death of their daughter. 

